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ABSTRACT
In big data systems, the infrastructure is such that large amounts of data are hosted away
from the users. Information security is a major challenge in such systems. From the customer’s
perspective, one of the big risks in adopting big data systems is in trusting the service provider who
designs and owns the infrastructure, with data security and privacy. However, big data frameworks
typically focus on performance and the opportunity for including enhanced security measures is
limited. In this dissertation, the problem of mitigating insider attacks is extensively investigated
and several static and dynamic run-time techniques are developed. The proposed techniques are
targeted at big data systems but applicable to any data system in general.
First, a framework is developed to host the proposed security techniques and integrate
with the underlying distributed computing environment. We endorse the idea of deploying this
framework on special purpose hardware and a basic model of the software architecture for such
security coprocessors is presented. Then, a set of compile-time and run-time techniques are proposed
to protect user data from the perpetrators. These techniques target detection of insider attacks that
exploit data and infrastructure. The compile-time intrusion detection techniques analyze the control
flow by disassembling program binaries while the run-time techniques analyze the memory access
patterns of processes running on the system.
The proposed techniques have been implemented as prototypes and extensively tested us-
ing big data applications. Experiments were conducted on big data frameworks such as Hadoop
vi
and Spark using cloud based services. Experimental results indicate that the proposed techniques
successfully detect insider attacks in the context of data loss, data degradation, data exposure and
infrastructure degradation.
vii
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is defined as a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management
effort or service provider interaction [2]. It provides a swarm of services such as storage, software,
platform and infrastructure. The huge adoption of cloud computing led to the advent of a new
terminology called big data that is typically used to describe large volumes of structured and un-
structured data. Businesses such as software, finance, telecommunications, retail, medicine and
healthcare are all interested in uncovering the information hidden in big data. The euphoria around
analyzing big data led to the start of a new interdisciplinary field called data science which is a
mix of data analytics and machine learning. Data science tools implement and support algorithms
that run on big data and they need to produce results almost instantaneously to handle the high
demand and extreme competition. Inherently, an environment that can store, manage and process
big data quickly and efficiently is one of the most sought-after resources today.
1.1 Distributed Computing Environments for Big Data
Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) is a software technology for setting up and
managing computing and data exchange in a system of distributed computers [5]. Important com-
ponents of DCE are: naming service, authentication service, timing service, communication protocol
and file system. Though DCE has been around since the 90s, they became hugely popular in the
1
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last decade after big data architectures started representing them. DCE is suitable for big data
solutions because of their requirement to store petabytes, exabytes and larger amounts of data, and
process terabytes of data. Hence, big data solutions are built as a software stack that runs on top of
distributed computing environments. Today, big data solutions are used in various government and
enterprise domains such as software, finance, telecommunications, retail, medicine and healthcare.
According to a recent report by International Data Corporation [3], some of the frequent use-cases
of big data are information retrieval from complex, unstructured data; and real time data analytics.
Top computer industries such as Google, Amazon and Microsoft provide public and private clouds
that serve as infrastructure for other companies to manage their data. It is projected that the
worldwide revenues for big data and business analytics will grow from 130.1 billion dollars in 2016
to more than 203 billion dollars by 2020. Figure 1.1a shows the top industries that have already
adopted big data solutions and Figure 1.1b shows the top public cloud providers that provide ser-
vices to host big data solutions. These figures clearly suggest that the industry is moving towards
cloud based big data solutions. Some of the popular big data frameworks are: Google file system
along with MapReduce [6, 7], Hadoop [8], Spark [9].
1.2 Privacy and Security of Data
Along with its huge popularity and rapid market growth, the big data trend also has its
share of challenges and risks. Initially, architects and developers of big data solutions focused
only on performance. However, big data characteristics like velocity, volume, and variety magnify
security and privacy issues. End users have to trust the providers of cloud and big data services
that host their data. Such trust is built on an underlying assumption that the services will never be
compromised. But unexpected issues such as insider attacks or exploitation of vulnerabilities due
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to programmer errors can happen in any system anytime. In an era where extracting information
from data is sanctioned to all, users are understandably more skeptical to let the service providers
control their data that is stored away from them. This, along with the continuous increase in the
number of cyber attacks, elevate the importance for security in big data. Figure 1.2a shows different
kinds of vulnerabilities in big data related products from the Apache Foundation. Big data unicorns
such as Hortonworks, Cloudera, IBM, SAS acknowledge the importance for security and privacy.
Yet, the losses due to vulnerabilities in existing systems seem to overshadow the investments made
towards increasing system security. This shows that big data security is still in its budding stage.
For example, there is an immediate need to address architectural loopholes within the big data
systems. Instead, extensive analysis of stored data continues to be the central point when talking
about security and big data. In a privacy-first world, such models indirectly facilitate the abuse of
user data in the hands of the service provider.
1.3 Motivation for this Research
There has been an unprecedented rise in malicious programs and attacks all over the world,
as shown in Figure 1.2b. Institutions ranging from big companies such as LinkedIn, Yahoo, Target,
Sony Pictures etc., to small businesses have all been targeted by attackers. Recently, two unau-
thorized backdoors were discovered in Juniper Networks firewalls that might have given attackers
access to highly classified information. Some important facts about this particular hack are: (a) it
comes at the cost of compromising national security (b) it shows that even a major network security
company is vulnerable to attacks (c) it is believed that these backdoors were left undiscovered for
almost 3 years knowing the high stakes and having vast resources; and (d) it was reported that the
attackers could have deleted the security logs [10]. This is one of the many examples to show that
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the common attack prevention techniques, such as identity management, access control lists and
data encryption, are necessary but not sufficient to detect or prevent attacks. As per OpenSOC
[11], in 60% of breaches data gets stolen within hours of the breach and 54% of breaches are not
discovered for months. Another recent poll [12] revealed that 87% of companies reported being
concerned or very concerned about data privacy in the cloud. Cyber attackers are able to success-
fully hack into the networks of small, medium and large organizations everyday irrespective of the
numerous security systems in place. According to another recent survey [13], the top perceived
security threats are 1) Unauthorized access (63%), 2) Hijacking of accounts (61%), and 3) Malicious
insider attacks (43%). This indicates that software services need to have efficient attack detection
techniques along with strong attack prevention techniques for robust security. This forms the main
motivation for this dissertation research dealing with malicious insider attacks.
In this dissertation, the focus is on mitigating insider attacks that target exposure of data
that is hosted on distributed computing environments. Insider attacks have become increasingly
common and they are considered the toughest attacks to detect [16]. There does not exist much in
the literature on solutions for insider attacks in general [17]. This has been discouraging customer
companies from making use of cloud based solutions. Though privacy and security are touted to
be important problems in the big data world, the solutions concentrate only on leveraging big
data services for efficient security in other industries. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
robust solution for detecting or preventing insider threats within big data infrastructures. For
example, security mechanisms of popular big data systems such as Hadoop [8] and Spark [9] include
third-party applications such as Kerberos [18], access control lists (ACL), log monitoring and data
encryption (to some extent). But for an insider, especially a traitor, circumventing these mechanisms
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is not difficult [19]. It is crucial to address the problem of insider attacks in big data systems for four
main reasons: (a) traitor within the provider’s organization will be able to circumvent most of the
security protocols in place (b) sensitivity of customer data stored in the system is increasing by day
(c) a vulnerability or an attack will impact the confidentiality, integrity and availability guarantees
given to the user; and (d) there is no consensus or widespread agreement on well-defined security
standards in the big data community.
Intrusion attacks cover network intrusions, buffer overflows, protocol specific attacks such as
man-in-the-middle attacks, trojans, insider attacks etc. Insider attacks are used to describe attacks
that originate within an organization and are performed by employees of that organization who
have legitimate access to the system, and knowledge about the development and working of the
system. typically deal with an employee stealing data using USB drives or by masquerading as
another employee to gain access to unauthorized data [19]. Another form of insider attacks in big
data is data degradation where an insider modifies user data. A side affect of insider attacks in
big data is infrastructure degradation over time. Any such attacks are hard to detect and even
harder to prevent. With the increase in popularity of concepts such as differential privacy, the
biggest concern for these platforms is permanent data loss. Security compromised data often can
be irreversible. Hence, big data solutions need to be able to identify an attack on the data as
soon as it happens. In this regards, we believe that big data platforms might not need brand new
security algorithms but they need existing security methods to be applied in different combinations
and with new emphasis on securing user data and handling insider attacks. The main focus in this
dissertation is to identify such methods, modify them according to the platform needs and test them
thoroughly before proposing to use them.
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The intent of security solutions is to detect malicious attacks before they compromise the
security of the data. In this regards, solutions to insider attacks can be implemented at static
compile-time and/or dynamically at runtime. Having compile-time security solutions will decrease
the scope of possible insider attacks at runtime. This is very crucial for performance oriented
systems such as big data applications because they cannot afford to cater too many resources at
runtime. Compile-time analysis of programs is a static method to obtain information that can be
used for several purposes such as enhancing parallelism and resource management. Some examples of
such static analysis techniques in security domain are symbolic execution and control-flow integrity.
However, compile-time analysis for improving security in big data has not been done before. Hence,
in this dissertation multiple compile-time analysis techniques for attack detection are proposed.
These techniques are tailored for verifying the control flow of a job scheduled to run on a big data
system.
Typically in a big data cluster, when a user submits a request, the namenode (master)
creates a job and schedules it for execution on the datanodes (slaves) that host the required data
for the job. When the job is scheduled to execute at a datanode, static analysis techniques can
be run on the associated compiled binary or bytecode to find vulnerabilities and bugs. In this
regard, the proposed compile-time techniques address some of the data security concerns in big
data platforms by performing analysis of compiled programs at assembly language level. These
static analysis methods for intrusion detection can help mitigate the effects of vulnerabilities caused
due to misplaced jumps, uninitialized arguments, null pointers, dangling pointers etc.
However, such static analysis techniques have their limitations. Vulnerabilities due to buffer-
overflows, shared libraries and dynamic linking will continue to exist even after static analysis.
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Memory corruption attacks can be detected and prevented at runtime with the help of address
sanitizers [20]. But handling improper calls due to programmer errors is still a difficult problem to
address. Insiders and masqueraders in distributed environments such as cloud and big data cannot
be completely mitigated by using only static techniques [21]. Also, static analysis of programs will
not work if a datanode configuration is changed by an insider or if a rogue datanode intentionally
masquerades the information it shares. Due to the distributed nature of big data platforms and
their requirement to provide data consistency (with the help of replication), it is possible to perform
dynamic analysis of processes for attack detection at runtime and prevent adverse outcomes such as
data loss. Hence, tighter intrusion detection and prevention techniques that analyze memory access
patterns and other system properties of processes are also proposed in this dissertation.
Memory access pattern of a process correspond to the addresses referenced and the number
of pages used. They typically remain the same for a given data used by the same application on
hardware using the same instruction set and main memory. Hence, such patterns can be monitored
and controlled by the system memory modules. For example, in many video and image applications,
the data is stored in a specific sequence and distributed to memory modules in a fixed manner. A
memory access pattern has multiple features to it such as shared pages, private pages, resident set
etc. Each feature conveys some insight about the memory behavior of a process. But raw values
of memory features can be diverse. Hence, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used in this
work to find regression among memory features. Using PCA, raw memory access patterns can be
represented as a T-squared distribution by calculating distance from the center of the translated
space. Then, statistical analysis methods such as ANOVA and Tukey can be applied on such
distributions for analysis and comparison of variance.
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As big data technologies are becomming common, blind trust in the providers of big data
platforms is essential if the end user wants to store their data in the cloud because such trust
is built on an underlying assumption that the platforms and their security methods will never
be compromised. As a result, the providers have de facto control over user privacy at all times.
When unexpected issues such as insider attacks or vulnerability exploitation of programmer errors
happen, the system typically relies on intrusion detection techniques everytime. As such, techniques
for intrusion detection is a research area that is constantly evolving [22, 23, 24]. However, in this
dissertation we are also interested in developing a novel technique to predict the possibility of an
attack. The motivation behind prediction of attacks is to limit the impact of an attack and to reduce
the turnaround time of detecting attacks. Prediction of attacks involves analysis of behaviors and
symptoms such as deliberate markers, meaningful errors, preparatory behaviors, correlated usage
patterns, verbal behavior and personality traits [25]. From these sets of indicators, clues can be
pieced together to predict and/or detect an attack. In preemptive protection of data, prediction
techniques help in being prepared for an attack with predetermined security techniques.
Deep learning is a branch of machine learning based on algorithms that attempt to model
high level abstractions in data. It can be interpreted as automated machine learning that trains
on data to make predictions. Deep learning based neural networks prove to be efficient tools
in predictive analytics because they can model data that contains non-linear characteristics and
often in big data applications, data exhibits such non-linear propoerties. Hence, using deep neural
networks to predict attacks in big data systems is a promising direction to go forward for security
researchers. Long short-term memory (LSTM) is a popular recurrent neural network that has been
proved to work very well for time series and other simple sequence predictions. This method is
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widely used across domains such as image & video analysis [26], natural language processing [27],
stock markets and anomaly detection [28]. Typically, LSTM networks are built to run on big data
clusters but in this work LSTM networks are used to predict attacks within a big data cluster.
In the big data world, it is considered that moving computation to where the data resides
is better than the traditional approach of moving data for computation. The main features of big
data infrastructures are fast data processing, high scalability, high availability and fault-tolerance.
Availability and fault-tolerance of big data systems rely on intelligent replication of data. This
implies SPMD (single program, multiple data) style, parallel execution of the same program at
multiple locations. When a program is scheduled for execution on the big data cluster, it runs as an
individual process on every data node that hosts a copy of the program data. Data replication in big
data is crucial to provide high availability and fast processing. This replication of data on various
nodes in the big data system can also be utilized in providing security. Security for a computing
system can be implemented at hardware and software level. Security provided at hardware level
ensures isolation and tamper resistance of sensitive data such as keys used in cryptography. Given
the advantage of isolation that can be achieved at hardware level security, we propose delegating
security to special purpose hardware, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [29] and Intel’s
Trusted Execution chips (TXT) [30], that reside on the nodes of the big data cluster. Such an
infrastructure will have the advantages of (a) performing security analysis remotely (b) reducing
the overhead on main processor by delegating security, and (c) decreasing cost of data transfer while
providing security.
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1.4 Contributions of Dissertation
This dissertation explores some of the insider threats that exist in the big data field today
such as data loss, data degradation, data privacy and proposes techniques to counter them. This
is achieved by identifying specific areas in program behavior that pose threat to user data and
understanding distributed properties of big data frameworks. The specific contributions are:
• An independent framework and system architecture for enhancing security in big data systems.
• A set of compile-time techniques for detection of insider attacks:
– by estimating attack probability score of a program [19].
– by checking for control-flow graph isomorphorism [31].
– by using control instruction sequences [32].
• A run-time technique for detection of insider threats using process information such as system
calls and memory access patterns, and applying statistical comparison tests [33, 34].
• A run-time technique for predicting insider threats using memory access pattern of a process
and applying deep learning [35].
1.5 Significance of Contributions
The first contribution of this work is an independent framework that can host multiple
security techniques as needed by distributed computing environments. The software architecture
of this framework is designed such that it does not hinder the overall performance of the system.
This is possible because the proposed framework sits on top of the big data system. The proposed
light-weight security framework can be deployed on special purpose hardware such as coprocessors
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that are dedicated for security. Because the proposed framework does not involve modification of
underlying system, it can be adopted by any data system.
The effectiveness of a security framework depends on the security techniques it can accom-
modate. In order to protect user data from various insider attacks and threats, both compile-time
and run-time security techniques are needed. For this purpose, a set of compile-time techniques are
proposed in this dissertation to help with mitigating insider attacks that cause data loss and data
corruption. This is achieved by analyzing the control-flow of the jobs that are scheduled to run on
user data. These compile-time security techniques reduce the attack vector for local attacks that
target data exploitation.
Once the stage of compile-time analysis is crossed, the processes running on the big data
system are then analyzed by the proposed run-time security techniques. While one run-time tech-
nique proposed in this dissertation analyzes memory access patterns and system calls made by a job
to detect attacks, the other technique works towards predicting the possible threats by analyzing
the same memory access pattern of a process. A combination of all the compile-time and run-time
techniques proposed in this dissertation will prevent insiders from successfully attacking the system.
1.6 Outline of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the back-
ground and related work in the areas of security in general, security in distributed systems, security
in big data, hardware based security, control flow graphs and memory access patterns. This chapter
also gives a primer on Hadoop, PCA and LSTM. Chapter 3 presents software framework and the
system architecture that are capable to independently host the proposed security techniques and
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communication protocol. Chapter 4 presents a set of compile-time techniques proposed to detect
attacks and Chapter 5 presents the two run-time techniques proposed to detect and predict attacks.
The limitations of this work, conclusions and future work are presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2 : BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Research topics closely related to this work are: (a) handling vulnerabilities caused by pro-
grammer errors, (b) protection from insider attacks, (c) intrusion detection techniques in distributed
systems, (d) tracing application behavior for security in distributed systems, (e) security in big data
platforms such as Hadoop, (f) understanding control flow graphs for process analysis, and (g) ob-
serving patterns in memory accesses for finding anomalies in process behavior. But first, a primer
on big data frameworks is important to understand the necessity and impact of the aforementioned
research areas.
2.1 Frameworks for Big Data
A plethora of big data frameworks are available today. Most of them are open-source
under the Apache license, such as: Hadoop, Falcon, Atlas, Tez, Sqoop, Flume, Kafka, Pig, Hive,
HBase, Accumulo, Storm, Solr, Spark, Ranger, Knox, Ambari, ZooKeeper, Oozie, Metron etc.
These frameworks are usually hosted on distributed computing environments. Throughout this
dissertation Hadoop [8] is used interchangeably for a big data framework running on a distributed
compute environment. Thus, it is important to understand how Hadoop operates. The two major
components of Hadoop are Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS) and MapReduce. HDFS serves
as the distributed file system used to store massive data sets and MapReduce is used for data
processing on HDFS. Hadoop follows a master-slave architecture to mitigate costs related to data
processing, exception handling and attack recovery. Namenode acts as master of storage (HDFS)
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and manages all metadata related to the file system. Datanodes are slaves of Namenode and are
used to store the actual data, in blocks. JobTracker acts as a master of processing (MapReduce) and
manages the jobs and their access permissions at cluster and user levels. TaskTrackers are slaves
of JobTracker and are used to complete the map or reduce jobs allocated by their master. More
recent versions of Hadoop have another major component called YARN for resource management.
Namenode, datanode, jobtracker, tasktracker and all YARN components are all daemons that run
on a cluster of machines. Together with all the services provided by the Hadoop ecosystem, this
cluster of machines is called a Hadoop cluster. The basic workflow of Hadoop has 4 steps: HDFS
write to load data into the cluster; MapReduce to analyze data in parallel; HDFS write to store
results in cluster; and HDFS Read to read results from cluster.
2.2 Target Attacks and Vulnerabilities
This work considers only a subset of attacks and vulnerabilities that impact security of
data in distributed computing environments that host big data. Insider attacks and other data
attacks possible due to programmer errors and infrastructure loopholes make the attack vector of
this dissertation.
2.2.1 Insider Attacks
Though security in general computing has been extensively studied and implemented over
the years, computers are still vulnerable to attacks. Software based attacks that typically target
a computer network or system, called cyberattacks, are growing in their frequency and impact.
The plot for any type of software attack involves exploitation of a piece of code that runs on a
computer. It is inherent to this perspective about a cyberattack that security can be provided
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at two levels: (a) by the software that is used to compile and execute the program; and (b) by
the hardware that runs the program. Providing security at software level gives more context and
information about the target programs that are being protected. But this comes with the risk of the
security software itself being compromised. On the other hand, having security at hardware level
gives more isolation to the process of analyzing and securing programs though it becomes difficult
to give detailed context about the programs and the infrastructures running them. In any case, the
toughest software attacks to counter are the ones whose genesis is intentional and are performed by
those who have a good understanding of the underlying system. Such attacks are popularly known
as insider attacks.
Based on our literature review, we have identified four major questions that can guide
towards better handling of insider attacks: (a) who can perform these attacks? (b) what gets
affected? (c) how to detect these attacks? and (d) how to prevent them from happening? Figure
2.1 gives a list of entities to consider when dealing with insider attacks. The figure also shows the
four questions, from above, as relationships among the entities. Insider attacks can be performed
by (a) traitors who are legally a part of the system but want to misuse the access privileges given
to them; (b) masqueraders who get access to the system by stealing identities of those who have
legitimate access. Insider attacks can affect the proper functionality of a program or corrupt the
data used by the programs. Profiling and trapping are two common ways to detect insider attacks
[17, 25]. Profiling can be performed (a) at the program level [36, 37] and at the user level [38].
Techniques for profiling user behavior and network behavior have evolved over time and the latest
techniques use machine learning algorithms to achieve this [39, 40]. User profiling is performed by
observing resource utilization [41] and psychometric analysis [42]. Traps can be set in the programs
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Figure 2.1: Entities and Relationships in Insider Attacks
or in the network to force the attacker into performing certain actions that help towards exposing the
attack [43, 44]. The biggest concern with these insider attack detection methods is the possibility
of losing valuable data. Hence, insider attack prevention mechanisms such as identity management
[45, 46], access control lists [47, 18], data encryption [48, 49] etc must be employed at the same
time.
Insider attacks are a dangerous security problem in any domain because they are difficult
to predict and detect [25]. Hence organizations must try to safe guard their systems and data
from insider attacks [50]. Predictive models for user/program/network behavior with the help of
continuous monitoring is a widely adopted solution for insider attack detection. But such prediction
is not completely reliable and the difficulty in detecting attacks grows with the complexity of the
underlying system. Recent advancements in computing led to wide adoption of services such as
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cloud computing and big data which are extremely complex in their design and development. In
cloud computing, many insider attacks can be performed by misleading the client side services and
once compromised, data obtained can provide social engineering opportunities for cascade attacks
[51]. Having security as a service model for cloud environments [52] and having sealed clouds [53]
are some ideas proposed towards protecting cloud infrastructures from insider attacks. While cloud
computing is more about computing on the fly, big data deals with organizing and managing large
sets of data. Insider attack detection and prevention for big data frameworks is an area that is not
well explored yet.
Insider attacks are known to be difficult to detect and prevent in general. This problem
intensifies when the system under consideration is deployed on a large, distributed cluster. The
ideal solution to detect and/or prevent insider attacks is by automating every aspect of a system
such that there is no human intervention at all but obviously this is not feasible. Especially for
big data systems, there is usually a service stack at the provider’s end and another service stack
at the client’s end. Hence, cloud service providers such as Amazon and Google reduce the scope
for insiders by adopting a two step procedure: (a) making most aspects of their systems to run
automatically, and (b) asking their clients to do the same.
2.2.2 Programmer Errors
Programmer errors are a huge concern to security architects because anticipating the vul-
nerabilities due to programmer errors is difficult but at the same time they can give leeway to the
attackers in their attempt to compromise a system. Programming errors often lead to insecure inter-
action between system components and might create exploitable vulnerabilites in the applications.
A popular threat caused due to programming error is when an attacker obtains root privileges. Such
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exploits let the attacker take advantage of buffer overflows, race conditions, access to system files
that should be restricted etc. But such vulnerabilites can be handled by continuously auditing the
programs and having restricted access rights [54]. This is a technique that is widely adopted by
the industry in the recent past by leveraging big data platforms. In other cases, programmer errors
allow an attacker to misuse memory and data. Generally, such vulnerabilities can be mitigated
by enforcing control-flow integrity [55]. More specifically, programmer errors that lead to memory
corruptions can be handled by sanitizing memory instructions [20] in a program at compile-time.
Though this approach is memory intensive, it seems to work efficiently for applications that run
on a single machine. Using sanitizers in real-time distributed applications is not feasible. In this
work, the concentration is only on a subset of programmer errors that corrupt memory and cannot
be detected until runtime.
2.3 Security in Distributed Systems
Security in distributed systems has been well researched over the past two decades. For this
work, the focus is in two aspects of security in distributed systems: intrusion detection and tracing
system behavior to identify or predict such intrusions.
2.3.1 Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used to detect anomalous or malicious usage in a
computing device. Common design strategies for IDS are based on: (a) knowledge from prior at-
tacks, and (b) learning from the behavior of programs and/or users. Knowledge-based IDS usually
searches a program for known threat signatures that are stored in a database. With the drastic
increase in the number of zero-day attacks, relying on a pre-populated database of threats is unsuit-
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able. Even if it is assumed that an ideal database of all possible threats exists, maintaining it would
require a lot of resources and running search queries against it would be expensive. On the other
hand, behavior-based IDS tries to model, analyze and compare user and/or application behavior
to identify anomalies. Network usage (packets of data) is another common component observed by
such IDS. This technique needs more resources and is more complex than signature-based IDS but
it is more effective in a dynamically changing threat environment. Behavior-based IDS generally
try to capture the context and apply statistics and rules on that context to detect anomalies.
A distributed implementation of IDS is needed for systems that run on large clusters. Such
an IDS would have centralized control and can detect behavioral patterns even in large networks.
Efficient ways of data aggregation, communication and cooperation are key factors of success for
such distributed IDS and it has to be employed at multiple levels: host, network and data [56].
Hence, using big data platforms to support general-purpose distributed IDS implementations is a
recommended and popular practice. Some of the popular IDS using big data are: Apache Metron
[57], Apache Spot [58], IBM Guardium [59] etc. But in this work, the aim is to build an IDS that
can be used for security within a big data platform itself. IDS within a big data platform favors
behavior-based distributed IDS because of the naturally large and ever increasing scope of threats.
2.3.2 Tracing
The need for tools that can diagnose complex, distributed systems is high because the root
cause of a problem can be associated to multiple events/components of the system. Recent works
in the distributed tracing domain are concentrating on providing an independent service. Magpie
[60] works by capturing events in the distributed system and uses a model-based system to store the
traces. Xtrace [61] provides a comprehensive view for systems by reconstructing service behavior
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with the help of metadata propagation. Though it has similarities to the proposed approach of
providing task-centric causality, Xtrace concentrates on network level analysis. Retro [62] is another
end-to-end tracing tool that audits resource usage along execution path. The drawback with tools
such as Xtrace and Retro is that they are tightly coupled into the system and hence need the user
to modify source code. HTrace [63] is an Apache incubator project for distributed tracing which
requires adding some instrumentation to your application. Pivot Trace [64] is a dynamic causal
monitoring service for distributed systems that provides a happened-before relation among discrete
events. Fay [65] is another distributed event tracing platform that instruments code at runtime with
safe extensions. G2 [66] is a graph processing system for diagnosing distributed systems. Finally,
[67] proposed an anomaly detection method for MapReduce jobs in Hadoop by collecting provenance
data.
In this work, the idea is to trace system & library calls. Detecting intrusions using system
call stack has been explored before. Hofmeyr et.al [68] show that short sequences of system calls
executed by running processes are a good discriminator between normal and abnormal operating
characteristics. Many models such as Bayesian Classification, Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and
process algebra have been proposed for system call sequence analysis [69, 70, 71, 72]. In this
work, system and library call metadata is used to build behavior profile of a process. This is
done by extracting information about system calls made during runtime from the call stack. Also,
information related to library calls is included in the behavior profiles because big data frameworks
use library calls that can be completely accounted for. This aspect of the proposed approach is
similar to AWS CloudTrail [73] which enables user to retrieve a history of API calls and other
events for all of the regions within the user’s account.
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2.4 Security in Big Data
Security in big data is gaining tremendous momentum in both research and industry. But
big data security is overwhelmingly inclined towards leveraging big data’s potential in providing
security for other systems [74]. Security within big data systems is still a budding phenomenon.
It is ideal to include security as a major component in the holistic view of big data systems. But
the requirements of big data applications such as real-time data processing, fault tolerance and
continuous availability give little scope to employ complex and robust security mechanisms. All
existing security techniques implemented within big data frameworks are software based and try to
prevent external entities from attacking the system.
For example, Hadoop security model is built on three pillars: multilevel authentication, log-
based analysis and encryption. Strong authentication is provided to Hadoop by Kerberos [18] which
is an integral part of the Hadoop ecosystem. Advantages of having such simple software oriented
security mechanisms, such as Kerberos, are better performance and simple management. The main
requirements in Hadoop security design focus only on access control [75]. But there are various
problems with such a policy enforcing security software, as identified in [76] and [77]. Also, none
of these approaches can strongly counter insider attacks. Newer versions of Hadoop have an option
to configure the Hadoop cluster in secure mode which supports multiple levels of authentication.
Activity at any level inside a Hadoop system is logged with the help of in-built services such as
log4j [78]. These logs are extensively used by the system level services and administrators for
various management purposes such as understanding resource utilization and security monitoring.
Encryption is an option available in the recent versions of Hadoop to support data confidentiality
between services and clients. Other software services such as Zookeeper [79] and research projects
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such as Rhino [80] and several other open jiras are continuously working on improving Hadoop
security. But some problems with existing Hadoop security services are:
• Having centralized control. Kerberos, Bastion boxes, Zookeeper etc need synchronization and
incur delay in risk assessment and recovery.
• Being integral to the system. All security services are built into the Hadoop ecosystem and
hence need to be implicitly trusted.
• Burden on the main processor. Even the optimized encryption/decryption standards such as
AES-NI[81] need minimum 2 real cpu cores for efficiency.
• Come with unreal assumptions. According to any Hadoop admin manual, users cannot have
access to machines in the cluster that store their data.
According to Hadoop Security Design[75], permissible performance overhead for a change in
architecture is only 3%. This is precisely the reason behind coarse-grained security mechanisms such
as data encryption being an optional and restricted feature in big data systems. Data encryption
in Hadoop is only available for data that gets exchanged between user and the system but not for
data that travels within the system. Randomized data encryption for data security was proposed
in [82] but this work acknowledges that faster results are yet to be achieved. Attack tolerance
for big data systems through redundant fragmentation was proposed in [83] where the idea is to
stripe data chunks and re-assemble them. This idea is based on redundancy and does not show
any experimental results about the overhead involved. Also, big data properties such as large scale
distributed infrastructures and replication make it difficult to detect insider attacks precisely using
the traditional methods.
24
In this work, the inefficiency of existing big data security mechanisms is demonstrated by
implementing two insider attacks on a big data cluster. The four attack scenarios implemented and
demonstrated in this work are (a) an insider from Hadoop ops team who has access to a machine/log
file can modify or delete it, leading to data loss (b) an insider from system admin team can tamper
with log data which leads to faulty results and data degradation (c) an insider who has access to
configuration files can modify datanode configuration that can result in bad system performance,
and (d) an insider who has access to user data can distribute it and impact differential privacy.
2.4.1 Attack 1: Data Loss
Metadata about the cluster file system is stored on Namenode in 2 parts: fsImage that is
used when the HDFS services are started and EditLog that is updated constantly (hdfs-default.xml
or hdfs-site.xml has the configuration settings related to this). As per the initial Hadoop archi-
tecture, Namenode was a single point of failure. But using a secondary namenode to store HDFS
information resolves this problem in most cases. Also, the secondary namenode helps in making the
file system updates invisible to the user. This is done by having periodic updates to the fsImage on
secondary namenode with the help of local EditLog and dumping the resultant fsImage to namen-
ode in a snapshot. In this scenario, if an attacker (insider from Hadoop ops) modifies the EditLog
on secondary namenode, the next checkpoint will reflect that change on the fsImage of namenode
which can lead to data loss. The same attack scenario was implemented on the Hadoop cluster.
A high level model of the attack is given in figure 2.2a and the results of the attack are given in
2.2b. In figure 2.2a, Op represents an insider from the Hadoop ops team. From figure 2.2b, it can
be noticed that the file system originally had 297 data blocks. But after the EditLog on secondary
namenode got modified by a script, the existing file system i.e. fsImage got erased completely. This
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change was reflected in the namenode at the next checkpoint i.e. after 10 minutes. A system admin
who has access to the secondary namenode in a Hadoop cluster can implement this attack. This is
an example of loophole in the Hadoop architecture that can be misused easily by insiders.
2.4.2 Attack 2: Data Degradation
Hadoop logs are mostly used for management purposes. From a security standpoint, server
logs are used by system admins to identify potential attacks on the system. Log data can be stored
in structured formats such as tables using Hadoop scripting languages such as Pig and Hive. System
admin can then use BI tools such as MS Excel to easily analyze the structured log data. Flume
and Kakfa are two popular big data products for real-time event processing. Most big data analysis
and security solutions tend to use these services within their framework. An example of system
log monitoring is given in a tutorial by Hortonworks [84] where DDOS attacks are being tracked
down by system admins. As per the workflow in this example, users requests the client service to
access data stored in HDFS. These user requests will all be logged by the log4j service. Hence, any
attackers requests will also be logged. The system admin can easily build a framework with the
help of services such as Flume, Hive and Hcatalog to monitor and track the user requests. In this
example, Hortonworks used Flume for streaming data transfer of Hadoop logs into Hcatalog which
is a SQL based Hadoop data store. Interestingly, this tutorial can be used as a counterexample
to show that admin can act as a traitor, manipulate the server log data and create results that
depict a wrong picture to the higher administration. In this example, an attacker (insider from
system admin) can alter the results by modifying the log data before Flume can stream it into
Hcatalog. A model of this attack scenario is shown in figure 2.3a where 1,2,3 are examples of DDOS
attack requests from client side that will be logged by the system. A malicious script from the
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(a) Attack Model to Create Data Loss.
(b) Example Showing Actual HDFS Data Size.
(c) Example Showing Data Loss in HDFS after Attack.
Figure 2.2: A Scenario for Data Loss in a Hadoop Cluster.
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Hadoop ops side (as an insider job) is run on the system that would modify log data before Flume
starts streaming it. From figure 2.3b it can be noticed that it is possible to taint the results by
implementing attacks on log files even though Hadoop services seem to be working as expected.
The part of figure 2.3b labeled Before shows the actual data of origins of user requests and attacks
while the part labeled After shows the modified output.
2.4.3 Attack 3: Data Exposure
This attack involves two cases: (a) the use of non-certified (and untrusted) equipment to
transfer data from one machine to another, and (b) the use of certified and trusted software (such
as a mail client) to transfer data from one machine to another. Similar to the previous attack,
the first step involved in this attack is for the system admin to modify the configuration through
the hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the Hadoop cluster. A new location local to the
system admin account is added to the DFS data directory property. As a result, all blocks at this
datanode have two copies - one copy in the actual HDFS location used while setting up the cluster
and another duplicate copy in the system admin’s local folder. Next, a script is used to simulate
an insider periodically transferring these duplicates files from his local folder of to another remote
location using the mail client service or USB device. Since it is not possible for us to connect a USB
device to Amazon EC2 instances, we found the system calls involved when using such a device and
called them in the attack script.
2.4.4 Attack 4: Infrastructure Degradation
This attack involves exploitation of access privileges by an insider who is legally allowed
to access the system and its configuration files. An insider who is a system admin can modify
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(a) Attack Model for Faulty Results
(b) Example Showing Actual Analysis Results.
(c) Example Showing Manipulated Analysis Results.
Figure 2.3: A Scenario for Data Degradation in a Hadoop Cluster.
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the configuration properties of a datanode to intentionally impact the performance of the overall
system. To implement this attack, the system admin changes the datanode configuration through
the hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the Hadoop cluster. The amount of memory allocated
for non-DFS purposes on the datanode were increased by 25% and the number of server threads for
the datanode were reduced by changing the handler count to 2. Since this is a one-time modification
made by an authorized user whose job entails modification of the configuration files, usual user-
profiling will not help in detecting the attack.
2.5 Special Hardware for Security
Hardware based security gained popularity in the last decade. Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) a device specification that enforces transitive trust in computing platforms by providing
methods for collecting and reporting the hardware and software components of a system. Versions
of TPM such as vTPM have also been proposed which can extend TPM to unlimited number
of virtual machines on a single hardware platform [85]. TrInc [86] is another security hardware
based on non-decreasing counters and shared symmetric key encryption. Though this approach
eliminates the need for trusted hardware, it is only applicable to equivocation-type misbehavior and
is not scalable. Ascend [87] is a data privacy conserving scheme for cloud such as environments.
It obfuscates instructions of a program to implement data privacy. But this comes at a cost of
modifying the ISA, average slowdown of 10-15% and no proper limits on obfuscation. Raksha [88]
proposes to use a dedicated tag coprocessor and memory for dynamic instruction flow tracking. With
a slowdown of less than 1% these coprocessors need to be synchronized with the main processor
core and are confined to individual machine level security.
30
Proposing hardware oriented security methods for Hadoop are on the rise in recent times. A
TPM based authentication protocol for Hadoop was proposed by [89] which claims to be much faster
than Kerberos, though it has not been fully implemented. A hardware oriented security method
to create trusted Apache Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) was proposed in [90] which is
a theoretically novel concept but was proven to work only on one node. The overhead of data
encryption by TPM acts as a hindrance in adopting this method, especially when the size of data
maintained in big data systems is ever growing. In this work, the idea of delegating security in big
data systems takes center stage. This is realized by designing an independent security framework
with the necessary components that can be hosted on secure hardware. The components of such
an architecture include security techniques capable of analyzing processes at both compile-time and
run-time. Though a set of five different security techniques are proposed in this dissertation, the
generic nature of the framework enables it to host other techniques in the future as well.
2.6 Control Flow Graphs
A control-flow graph (CFG) is a directed graph representation of a program and usually a
sparse graph. CFGs include all possible control paths in a program. This makes CFG a great tool
to obtain control-flow behavior of its process. Vertices in a CFG give the level of detail, such as
instruction-level or basic block level, that cannot be further divided. Edges in CFG represent control
jumps and are classified into two types - forward and backward. Branch instructions, function calls,
conditional and unconditional jumps account for forward edges. Virtual calls and indirect function
calls are also considered as forward edges but their destinations are difficult to determine. Loops
and returns generally account for backward edges. The integrity among duplicate processes that
run on replica nodes of a big data system can be verified with the information available in a CFG
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[91]. Similarity check between program logic of two programs can be performed by comparing their
CFGs for isomorphism. There are many ways to check for such graph isomorphism [92, 93] but
analyzing the similarity of two processes by conducting CFG level graph isomorphism is hard and
time consuming. Graph isomorphism is a complex problem, sometimes known to be NP-complete
as well [94]. To reduce the complexity of graph algorithms, CFGs can be reduced to trees or
subgraphs before performing any coherence or integrity checks [95]. A CFG can be converted to a
tree using methods such as Depth-first traversal. Several tree structures such as Dominator Tree,
Minimum Spanning Tree (MST), Minimum Spanning Arborescence (MSA) can be extracted form
CFGs [96, 97, 98]. CFGs can be broken into subgraphs using methods such as k sub-graph matching
and graph coloring. Assuming that a CFG has n vertices and m edges, some popular methods for
graph reduction and graph comparison that can be found in the literature are :
• Based on Edit Distance: Using Smith-Waterman algorithm with Levenshtein distance to iden-
tify similarity between two graphs that are represented as strings [99]. The time complexity
is O(nm).
• Based on Traversal : (a) A preorder traversal of a graph G where each node is processed before
its descendants. (b) A reverse postorder in a DAG gives a topological order of the nodes [100].
• Based on Dominator trees: Using a tree data structure built using the method proposed by
Tarjan in [101]. This method has a time complexity of O((n+m)log(n+m)). Depth First
Search can also be used.
• Based on Reachability : Applying transitive reduction of a sparse graph to convert CFG to
another graph with fewer edges but same transitive closure [102]. The time complexity is
O(nm).
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Figure 2.4: Multiple MSAs for a Single CFG from Disassembled Object Code.
In this work, a CFG is reduced to a set of MSAs (directed MSTs) because CFGs are generally
sparse graphs and hence the size of the set of MSAs is finite and usually small in number (less than
100). In such contexts, Edmond’s algorithm can be used to quickly extract all MSAs from a digraph
[96, 97, 98]. Since an MSA contains all vertices of its graph, there will be no loss in the program
instruction data. Depending on the connectedness of the graph, the edge count will defer between
the CFG and MSA representation of a program. Figure 2.4 shows transformation of a line of java
code to basic blocks of bytecode to CFG to set of MSAs. Vertices B1, B2, B3, B4 are the basic
blocks formed from java bytecode. There exists an O(m + n log n) time algorithm to compute
a min-cost arborescence [96]. Alternately, another approach for converting a CFG to MSA using
union find is used by popular compilers such as llvm and gcc for security purposes [103]. One
known disadvantage of using CFGs and MSAs for security is that dynamic link library calls cannot
be verified.
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Traditionally, IDS checks for known malware in programs by performing signature matching
on a threat database [104]. Signature match using exact string matching is limited in its scope.
This is because variants of same attack will have different signatures. Recently, methods to detect
new malwares using statistical machine learning have been proposed. Static analysis using CFG is
another efficient way to detect intrusions but it is very complex [105]. Converting a CFG to a string
and implementing string matching is another way to deal with this problem but the solution will
not be polynomial. Also, CFG at basic block level can have basic block variants that look different
but perform the same function. To deal with these shortcomings, many approximate matching
techniques have been proposed. Tracing applications to get their CFG is another approach that
is used in applications such as xtrace, pivottrace etc [106, 107]. In case of big data systems, data
nodes usually have the same processor architecture. Hence it can be assumed that there will be no
variants when the CFG is constructed at byte-level. It is then sufficient to verify similarity among
the CFGs of two processes to confirm coherence in the nodes of a big data system.
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [108, 109] which is another popular and effective technique for
attack prevention which enforces the execution of a program to follow a path that belongs to the
program’s control flow graph. The set of possible paths are determined ahead of time using static
CFG [108, 109]. A coarse-grained or fine-grained version of CFI can be used for program profiling.
But the problem with any such profiling techniques is the overhead incurred in conducting them,
even more if performed remotely. Though such limitations of this approach have been identified
[110], it is accepted as a strong and stable security enforcing mechanism. There are a plethora of
CFG-based code similarity algorithms [111]. But such CFG similarity check methods are complex,
expensive, have no defined standards. Most CFG similarity algorithms rely on some simplification
34
techniques such as fingerprints, edit distance, comparison only with known graphs in a database
etc. Also, the impact of CFG similarity analysis differs a lot depending on when and how the CFG
is generated for a program. These complexities and uncertainties led to a new set of control flow
analysis techniques that avoid translating the program code to a formal model. For example, insider
attack detection based on symbolic execution and model-checking of assembly code was proposed
in [112]. In this work, a novel approach for control flow similarity check for attack detection is
proposed that completely discards the idea of building CFGs. Instead, the proposed idea is based
on simple string matching of control instruction sequences obtained from assembly code of scheduled
processes. Another software testing technique that was proposed many decades ago and resurfaced
again recently is called symbolic execution [113]. This technique suffers with path explosion as well
and hence it is usually handled with the help of search heuristics [].
2.7 Memory Access Patterns
Understanding memory access patterns of big data applications will help in profiling them
from their data usage perspective. Patterns in bandwidth usage, read/write ratio or temporal and
spatial locality can be used when observing memory accesses of a process. For example, W.Wei
et al. [114] observed that memory access patterns of big data workloads are similar to traditional
parallel workloads in many ways but tend to have weak temporal and spatial locality. One of
the first works in characterizing memory behavior of big data workloads was done by Dimitrov et
al. [115] who observed the characteristics such as memory footprints, CPI, bandwidth etc. of the
big data workloads to understand the impact of optimization techniques such as pre-fetching and
caching. Other works such as [116, 117] explored the memory behavior of big data workloads at
cache and virtual memory level. In distributed compute systems, nodes of the cluster are typically
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virtual machines. For example, a Hadoop datanode is a process which dynamically dispatches tasks
every time a job is scheduled. So, profiling the sizes of the private and shared memory accesses of
all tasks will give the memory access pattern of the datanode.
2.7.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is an unsupervised linear transformation technique
that finds the directions of maximal variance in a given dataset [118, 119, 120]. A principal compo-
nent is a linear combination of all the variables that retains maximal amount of information about
the variables. When used for fitting a linear regression, PCA minimizes the perpendicular distances
from the data to the fitted model. This is the linear case of what is known as orthogonal regression
or total least squares [118], and is appropriate when there is no natural distinction between predic-
tor and response variables. This is perfect for memory access pattern matching problem because
the features of memory access are all random and do not follow any predictor-response relation. Of
course, PCA is only one of the tools to achieve the desired results for this problem. Other techniques
like Guassian Mixture Models (GMM), tests for homogeneity of variance such as Box’s M test or
Bartlett’s test can also be used.
According to the theory of orthogonal regression fitting with PCA [118], p observed variables
can fit an r dimensional hyperplane in p dimensional space where r is less than equal to p. The
choice of r is equivalent to choosing the number of components to retain in PCA. For this work, r
and p are the same because reducing the dimensionality of the dataset is not needed. But to profile
memory usage of a process and then compare it with other profiles, a function that can explain the
memory behavior is needed. For this purpose, T-squared values are used that can be calculated
using PCA in the full space.
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2.7.2 Long Short-term Memory
Neural networks are efficient tools to build predictive models that can learn regularities
in simple sequences [121, 122]. A neural network is usually a feed-forward network built using
perceptrons that take multiple inputs and use an activation function, some weights and biases to
compute a single output. It learns to adjust the weights and biases over time using an optimization
function called gradient descent algorithm. Back propagation [123] is the most popular method for
gradient calculation that gives an insight to how quickly the cost changes when the weights and
biases are changed in a neural network. Feed-forward neural networks are the most commonly used
versions of neural networks and they are used to solve classification problems. In recent times,
a modification of neural networks called recurrent neural networks (RNN) is gaining popularity
because it uses a chain-like structure and can connect the perceptrons in a directed cycle that
creates internal memory to store parts of the input sequence and intermediate results [124]. But
back propagation in such networks takes extremely long time. Also, standard RNNs have to deal
with the vanishing or exploding gradient problem where they eventually fail to learn in the presence
of time lags between relevant input events and target signals [125]. To solve this problem a gradient
method called Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) was introduced that can help preserve the error
that can be backpropagated through time and layers [126].
LSTM networks work by using cells that are made up of a set of gates: forget gate (FG),
input gate (IG), cell gate (CG) and output gate (OG). These cells and their gates help in retaining,
adding or deleting information from one pass to another. A vanilla LSTM implementation use all
gates and relies on activation functions such as sigmoid (σ), tanh for proportional selection of data.
While sigmoid (σ) function is used to open/close a gate in the LSTM cell, the tanh function is
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Figure 2.5: Sample LSTM Cell Design [1]
FG = σ(wfg × [ot−1, it] + bfg) (2.1a)
IG = σ(wig × [ot−1, it] + big) (2.1b)
CG = tanh(wcg × [ot−1, it] + bcg) (2.1c)
ct = ct−1 × FG+ IG× CG (2.1d)
OG = σ(wog × [ot−1, it] + bog) (2.1e)
ot = OG× tanh(ct) (2.1f)
applied to cell state and output selection where the result can be positive/negative. LSTM also
uses stochastic optimization functions such as Adam [127], RMSprop [128] or stochastic gradient
descent for measuring the gradient in the output. Since there is no conclusive evidence for which
optimization function works best for LSTM, Adam is randomly chosen for this work. Figure 2.5 and
Equations 2.1 give a basic overview of how a LSTM cell works. Here wfg, wig, wog, wcg are weights
and bfg, big, bog, bcg are bias associated to gates while t−1, t are two consecutive steps in a sequence.
Every LSTM cell has three data values at each step: cell state (c), input (i) and output (o). Many
variations have been proposed to vanilla LSTM [129] but researching all such variations is not the
main focus for this work.
2.8 Context of this Research
The current state of the art for security in general is driven by the more popular security
risks such as injection, cross site scripting and broken authentication. In this work, the problem of
insider attacks is investigated thoroughly. The target environment for this research is a big data
system and the focus is on protecting sensitive data from exposure and destruction. The current
state of the art for security in big data systems is access control, log monitoring, data encryption (at
rest and in transit) and network analysis. These methods protect data from attacks that originate
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outside the system and the attacker is an external user. A set of techniques are proposed to detect
and predict insider attacks and significantly advance the current state of the art.
39
CHAPTER 3 : PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The main strategy proposed in this dissertation is to delegate security of big data frameworks
that run on distributed compute environments to secure hardware. To realize this, a set of security
techniques are proposed that exploit big data system properties such as replication. However, an
efficient framework is needed to develop a complete security solution that can tie these techniques
together. Hence, a security framework is also proposed that is built with components that integrate
to support the two step security solution: (step 1) analyze programs locally and, (step 2) verify
analysis results dynamically.
3.1 Local Analysis
The first step in the holistic view of the proposed security solution is to analyze programs
locally at slave nodes. Each slave node i.e. datanode can perform such local analysis on two separate
occasions. The first stage of analysis is performed before the program is scheduled to run. This step
is realized using one of the proposed compile-time security techniques. Primary focus of this static
analysis is to detect security holes in a program by verifying the control-flow obtained from program
binaries and using instruction level rules and heuristics. The next stage of analysis is performed
during execution of a program to detect and predict attacks. The final analysis is performed after
the program terminates. Analysis that is done during or after program execution use the run-time
security techniques. This stage is also known as the Process Profiling stage. In this work, run-time
analysis is limited is call and memory usage of a process.
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3.2 Dynamic Verification
Besides performing local analysis of programs that run on them, each datanode also verifies
program information it receives from other replica datanodes. This verification step is a matching
technique where local analysis results are compared with received analysis information. Methods
and heuristics used for this matching process depend upon the features examined. Some examples
techniques that can be used in the matching process are: graph and string matching techniques,
statistical analysis tests and deep learning techniques. After the matching process, datanodes share
their analysis results with the replica datanodes and reach a consensus about the existence of an
attack. Consensus algorithms like raft [130] and paxos [131] or any simple home-brewed consensus
solution can be used in this stage for communication among replica datanodes. This stage is also
known as the Matching stage or the Verification and Consensus stage. Figure 3.1 shows a high-level
overview of the proposed security architecture.
3.3 Secure Communication
A big data system is technically a distributed data storage system that relies on secure and
efficient communication protocols for data transfer. The proposed system aims to provide robust
security for big data systems by having a modular design and being independent from the core big
data services. For this reason, a separate secure communication protocol is included in the proposed
framework that can be isolated from the set of default communication protocols used by the big
data system.
The proposed framework is a mix of independent security modules that work together and
reside on individual nodes of the system. These modules need a secure communication protocol to
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Figure 3.1: System Architecture for Security in Big Data Systems.
share packets of data with their counterparts on other nodes of the cluster. The data shared among
the security modules contain vital information about the analysis of a process. Hence, a public
key cryptosystem based on RSA key exchange [132] is used in the proposed secure communication
protocol. Simply put, the secure communication protocol uses asymmetrical public and private
keys to encrypt and decrypt data. Pairs of keys are created together where each key is a large
random number generated from a set of hardcoded keys that are not accessible to anyone. All data
transferred by any node using this secure communication channel is encrypted upfront using private
key encryption. The associated public key will be shared with all other replica nodes that a data
node has to communicate with. This simple idea can be realized with the help of hardware security
chips such as TPM [29] or Intel’s TXT [30] that have public-private key encryption modules. Such
hardware security chips come with a hardcoded, on-chip master key. A simple random number
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generator module is used to generate public-private key pairs periodically using the hardwired
master key.
In this work, SSH protocol and RSA encryption algorithm for key exchange are used together
for secure communication though any such cryptosystem will work. Given the off chance of leakage of
private keys, a key pair is held active for only a certain time period T . This increases the robustness
of the communication protocol. In this work, the focus is not on finding the perfect value for T and
hence a good value for T is assumed to be 10 seconds. The public key of a node is shared with
all other nodes it has to communicate with i.e. replica nodes and master node. All incoming data
packets to a node will be encrypted with its current public key and can only be decrypted using
the corresponding private key that is stored locally. Once the messages are decrypted, information
will be sent to the process matching module to identify attacks using various similarity measuring
techniques.
Given the short lifespan of public keys used in the secure communication protocol, each node
should be able to store public keys of all other nodes it has to communicate with. Also, storing
older keys of other nodes helps in verifying authenticity of nodes in case of attack recovery. Hence,
a queue data structure is used on every node to store the periodically generated public keys of other
nodes. Back of queuen will be the latest public key to be used for encrypting packets to be sent
to node n while front of queuen will be deleted when queuen is full (to accommodate a new key).
Limiting the maximum queue size by some k will make sure that a node has enough information to
support attack recovery measures while not consuming too much memory. Finding the perfect value
for k is outside the scope of this work and hence a predefined value of 5 was used while conducting
the experiments.
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Algorithm 1 shows the steps involved in the proposed secure communication protocol. Once
a model of the proposed system is installed, all nodes will periodically generate public-private key
pairs for as long as the system is in use. This is accomplished with the help of the hardwired key
on the special purpose security chip and the random number generator module. At the end of every
T time units, a new public-private key (newkpn) is generated on a node for communicating with
replica node n. The private key privn of newkpn will be used for decrypting incoming data from
node n and the public key pubn of newkpn will be shared with node n. For ease of access to keys
during decryption, current private keys of all nodes are stored in an array arrpriv[]. The loop given
between lines 4 and 9 in the algorithm 1 depict the key generation phase. Once a public key pubn is
shared with node n, all incoming messages from node n will only be decrypted using the associated
privn for the next T time units. An array of queues, arrpub[], is used to store public keys received
from all other nodes. When a node has to send an message msg to replica nodes, the public key
of that node is used to create an encrypted message msge. The loop given between lines 10 and
14 in the algorithm 1 depict the key usage phase for encryption and decryption of messages shared
among replica datanodes.
3.4 Model of the System Architecture
The proposed framework is a combination of 3 parts: local analysis, dynamic verification
and secure communication protocol. As shown in Figure 3.1, these three parts are made of multiple
modules that need to be installed on all nodes in the big data system. Also, locality of these modules
impacts the performance of the system greatly. The closer they are to the main processor of a node,
the faster and less expensive it will be to communicate. However, from a security standpoint these
modules need to be isolated from the big data system main workflow. Hence, the model for the
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Algorithm 1 Secure Communication Protocol
1: procedure Secure Communication Protocol
2: while true do
3: if time = T then
4: for n in OtherNodes do
5: newkpn ← get new public private key pair from TPM chip
6: pubn ← get public key from newkpn
7: privn ← get private key from newkpn
8: noden ← send(pubn)
9: arrpriv[n]← privn
10: for n in OtherNodes do
11: if queuen = full then
12: dequeue(queuen)
13: queuen ← enqueue(pubn)
14: arrpub[n]← queuen
15: msg← to be sent to all replicas
16: for r in Replicas do
17: pubr ← back(arrpub[n])
18: msge ← encrypt(msg, pubr)
19: send(msge)
proposed system is designed to fit on isolated special purpose security hardware chips. Such chips
can be built on top of existing security hardware such as TPM or Intel’s TXT chips [29, 30]. When
compared to a software solution that can be very adaptive, hardware solutions are popularly known
to affect the scalability and flexibility of the big data infrastructure. Such problems are avoided in
this work by decoupling the proposed solution from the actual workflow of the big data platform.
There will be a one-time extra cost due to the hardware security modules. An overview of the
elements in such a model of the proposed system is given in Figure 3.2 where modules with bold
boxes represent the proposed security techniques. The functionality of each of these elements is as
follows:
• Analyzer, this module will get the data from the hotspot VM and perform the initial steps of
cleaning the data. Result from analyzer is stored in Memory.
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Figure 3.2: Basic Hardware Model for the Proposed Security Framework.
• CFI filter, this module takes input, a set of assembly language instructions, from the Analyzer
module (technically, the Memory module) and filters out the control flow instructions, while
maintaining the order.
• Statistical Tester, this module implements the various statistical tests to be performed on
memory information such as PCA, ANOVA, Tukey etc.
• RNN, this module implements a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for attack prediction from
memory information.
• APS Scorer, this module calculates the Attack Probability Scores (APS) of programs with the
help of rules defined in the Look Up Table (LUT).
• Sequencers, there are three sequencers in the proposed model, one each for jumps, calls and
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returns. Each sequencer goes through the output of CFI filter module and forms a delimited
sequence string of the instruction it is associated with. Then, the sequencer uses the SHA
hasher module to generate and store a fixed length hash output from the variable length
instruction sequence string.
• Register Array, there are 4 registers in this array to store message, jump instruction hash, call
instruction hash and return instruction hash.
• Message Register, this is a special register in the Register Array used to store the message in
thread-safe manner.
• Message Generator, this module combines all the individual hash outputs stored in registers
and uses the SHA hasher module to generate a fixed length hash output. This hash of hashes
is combined with the process metadata to generate and store a message that represents the
process.
• Encryptor / Decryptor, this module uses the Key Store to access the current set of pub-
lic/private keys and the Message Register to access the current process message. The Encryp-
tor module uses the public key of a replica node from the Key Store and encrypts the message
in Message Register. The decryptor module uses the private key of the node from the Key
Store to decrypt an incoming message.
• Comparator, this module performs string comparison between local message (hash of hashes)
and received message.
• Key Generator, this module uses the underlying TPM/TXT chip’s [29, 30] in-built function-
ality. The hardwired key and the random number generator of the security chip are used
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to generate a new public/private key pair; and the timer of the chip to trigger this action
periodically.
• Key Store, this module uses an array of memory locations to store the public key queues of
all replica nodes and the current public / private key pair of this node. The three most recent
public keys of each replica node is stored in its queue.
• Exchanger, this module uses TCP/IP protocol to exchange messages with other nodes.
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CHAPTER 4 : COMPILE-TIME TECHNIQUES1
The first set of program analysis techniques proposed in this work are static compile-time
driven methods. These methods focus on extracting control-flow information from compiled pro-
grams that are scheduled to run on the big data cluster. Each technique uses a different strategy
to achieve this, both at the local analysis step and the verification step. Assumptions and goals
about (a) the surveyed environment, and (b) the attacks under consideration must be listed before
exploring the details of the techniques. For this purpose, an attack model is given upfront.
4.1 Attack Model
This attack model focuses on two use cases: (a) misuse of log data, and (b) exploitation of
programmer error vulnerabilities. As per the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) the
attack vector is local for these attacks because the exploitable scope is via read/write/execute [133].
The scope of possible insiders is confined to the system admins of a big data cluster. Also, as per
hadoop security standards [75], system admins do not have access to the entire cluster. Security
features such as data confidentiality and operational guarantees such as correctness of results can
be compromised according to this attack model. The goals of an insider conducting such attacks
can vary from personal vendetta to financial gain. The proposed system targets such specific insider
attacks because they are relatively easy to implement with existing security solutions on platforms
1Portions of this chapter were previously published in Santosh Aditham and Nagarajan Ranganathan. A novel
framework for mitigating insider attacks in big data systems. In Big Data (Big Data), 2015 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 1876-1885. IEEE, 2015.
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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such as Hadoop and Spark. Attacks targeting misuse of log data can be performed by creating
malicious programs or by modifying of existing program binaries with malicious intent. Given the
existing security features of user-level activity monitoring, the possibility of system admins creating
and executing new malicious programs is excluded from the scope of this attack model. Instead,
the attack model focuses on system admins being able to modify binaries of existing programs. It
is acknowledged that insider attacks are too broad and not all of them can be mitigated by the
proposed solution. There can be other possible insider attacks in big data that are not visible at
compile time and the proposed system may or may not be able to detect.
4.2 Technique Based on Attack Probability Score
The central theme to all proposed compile-time techniques is to reduce the amount of work
needed to analyze a program binary. In this approach of detecting attacks based on Attack Prob-
ability Score (APS), a program binary is uniquely represented with the help of a numeric value
(score) and two stack data structures.
4.2.1 Proposed Methodology
The main function of the proposed framework is to analyze processes to identify insider
attacks. An attack in big data systems can be construed as unauthorized manipulation of data
by a process running on one or more nodes of the cluster. As mentioned previously, coprocessors
such as Rasksha [88] are capable of performing process level DIFT analysis with very low overhead.
But according to [134] and [135], control flow instructions are more vulnerable to attacks than any
other type of instructions in modern processors. Hence, it is safe to assume that the control flow
of a process must indicate the possibility of an attack. Control flow of a process can be analyzed
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before or after the process is scheduled. Analyzing a process after it is scheduled is beneficial for
the framework and big data systems in general for three reasons: (a) easy to delegate to special
hardware; (b) no impact on performance of the system, and (c) the fact that a program can be
modified anytime by an insider before its object code is scheduled. Hence, process analysis in the
proposed framework is limited to monitoring the control flow instructions from the disassembled
object code (DOC) of a process that is generated using recursive traversal. So, a disassembler
is used that can convert the scheduled object code (process) to assembly code. A disassembler
that uses recursive traversal must be able to restore the control flow of the program in its output
assembly code. Since the idea is to delegate such process analysis work to dedicated hardware, we
take the liberty to assume safe and secure transfer of DOC of a process from main processor to such
dedicated hardware.
A simple scan of the DOC for predefined control flow instructions enables us to mark the
findings as possible areas of vulnerability in the code. But not all control flow instructions in the
DOC can (or) will lead to an attack. Identifying an attack based on DOC level process analysis can
be tricky for big data systems due to the possibility of false positives. An authorized administrator
might be modifying the data as part of maintenance. Hence, a rule engine that categorizes instruc-
tions and data depending on their risk factor will be used while scanning the DOC of a process.
Ideally, a rigorous rule engine is needed here that can differentiate attacks from authorized tasks.
A full implementation of such rule engine is not the main focus and is out of scope for this work.
Hence, a small rule engine is created with a small set of rules for few basic control flow instructions
and data inputs. Table 4.1 gives an illustration of the rule engine used by this work. Such rule based
process analysis is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to confirm an attack in big data
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Table 4.1: Basic Rule Engine.
No. Rule APS
1 call delete, call rename very high
2 jump indirect high
3 return medium
4 all non-control flow instructions low
5 all NOP instructions very low
systems. Confirmation of an attack can be achieved through consensus which needs communication
among replicas. For such consensus, a node which suspects an attack on primary copy of data must
be able to convey the same to its replicas using a simple message. Hence, a new metric called attack
probability score (APS) is introduced.
APS is introduced in the proposed framework such that a node with primary copy of data
can convey about a possible attack in a process to all the replica nodes. APS is important because
it can alleviate the cost of comparing instruction and data stacks for every process at replica nodes.
APS is based on % CFI of a process because it can: (a) capture the control flow property of a
process to some extent (b) ensure same output for a process on any node (c) calculated easily,
independently & internally by secure coprocessors and (d) used to sort processes in the compare
phase of the proposed algorithm such that processes with high APS are compared first because they
have higher chances to be attacked. APS value does not indicate if a process has been attacked or
not. It is merely a process representation technique. APS is given at two levels: instruction and
process. At instruction level, this score signifies attack probability of the instruction. Instructions
and their APS are stored in a look-up table. APS values of individual instructions will be unique
because they are derived based on the vulnerability quotient of the instruction. For example, as per
general convention, a call or an indirect jump instruction is more vulnerable to attacks than an ADD
instruction. At process level, APS has to represent a process based on process properties. Hence,
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Figure 4.1: Steps for Calculating Attack Probability Score.
a logarithmic scoring rule is used, as given in equation 4.2 to calculate APS of process. Here, X is
a boolean value to indicate if the process is attacked or not and P is the probability of having an
attack. The probability P is calculated using equation 4.1 where a process has n instructions out of
which k are CFI. During the compare stage a node can sort the processes to compare, depending on
their APS value such that processes with more control flow instructions can be compared first. The
basic steps to follow while calculating APS for a given DOC using equations 4.2 and 4.1 are given in
figure 4.1. From the DOC of a program, the first step is to filter the control flow instructions (CFI).
These CFI are pushed to the instruction stack in their order of appearance in the DOC. While doing
so, the lookup table is referred to calculate the APS of that instruction. Next, the same steps are
followed for the data field of the instruction. Here, the focus is more on the registers or memory
locations used but not on the actual values of the data field. Thus, APS of an instruction is the
sum of APS of its instruction code and data location. For all non-CFI, the APS value should be
predefined to a value much lesser than its CFI counterparts.
P =
∑k
cfi=0APScfi∑k
cfi=0APScfi +
∑n−k
noncfi=0APSnoncfi
(4.1)
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APSprocess = X.log(P ) + (1−X).log(1− P ) (4.2)
Though APS is designed to represent the attack probability of a process, it does not uniquely
identify a process. The mapping between APS and its source program is one to many. This is a
problem for the attack verification step. Simple comparison of APS values of two programs is not
sufficient to comment on the similarity of the two programs. A unique representation for every
program is needed for this. Hence, the idea of representing a program uniquely with the help of
a hierarchical model is proposed. First level of this model uses APS. The next level uses stack
data structures where insertion and deletion follows a specific pattern. So, the combination of APS,
instruction stack and data stack can uniquely represent a program.
Process analysis using DOC and an established rule engine can be very simple and straight-
forward with the help of appropriate data structures. A (key, value) pair format can be used to
represent a control flow instruction and its APS. As mentioned before, identifying the general level
of vulnerability of a control flow instruction and giving it an appropriate APS is an implementa-
tion detail that this work does not address. But assuming that it is taken care of, a lookup table
containing all control flow instructions and their associated APS has to be maintained in static
memory of the hardware that is performing the process analysis. This will help in faster access
while retrieving APS of instructions and will not consume much memory. It is assumed that an
instruction in DOC follows the format of opcode (arg1, arg2) where arguments arg1 and arg2 can be
registers and/or constants. Two separate stack data structures: Instruction Stack and Data Stack
are used to analyze DOC of a process. Having only push and pop operations makes stack a good
fit to preserve the sequence of instructions and precisely identify the attack. This approach can be
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associated to phase analysis [136] where the way a program traverses the code during execution is
captured and analyzed. Also, while confirming an attack a complete scan of non-identical stacks is
not needed which leads to faster analysis. Finally, having different stacks for instruction and data
of each process makes data transfer, encryption and decryption more modular. The requirements
of such hardware would be:
• Memory:
– Stack data structures to store instructions and data values of a process under suspicion.
– A static map to store all possible control flow instructions of the underlying ISA along
with their associated attack probability scores.
– Registers to store the hardwired on-chip key that serves as a master key and other
intermediate keys used for encryption.
• Processing:
– Hardware capable of running encryption algorithms to create packets for secure commu-
nication among replicas.
– Hardware capable of performing analysis of Disassembled Object Code (DOC), calcula-
tion of APS and secure communication with replicas.
This algorithm runs inside the dedicated hardware as soon as the DOC of a program is
received. The proposed framework is limited to checking the control flow instructions but other
factors such as data access through sensitive registers or memory locations can also be added here.
Depending on final APS value of the process, an encrypted packet with process information is
broadcasted to all replicas. The overhead of running this algorithm is proportional to: (i) number
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of running processes and (ii) size of DOC of each process. The size of the encrypted packages to be
shared with replica nodes is directly proportional to the number of control flow instructions in the
process they are associated to.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for process analysis on node with primary copy of data
Require: Compiled Code (DOC) of a process
Set-up secure communication among replicas;
Load APS lookup tables;
for all process scheduled do
while current instruction in APS lookup tables do
get APS of current instruction from APS lookup tables;
calculate attack probability using Equation 4.1 ;
calculate APS of process using Equation 4.2;
create packet with instruction & data stacks and APS;
encrypt packet with private key;
send packet to all replicas;
go to next process;
Local analysis identifies a possible attack on the primary copy of data. For consensus among
replicas to confirm the attack and to take any recovery or prevention steps, the replicas need to
be able to securely communicate among themselves. A complete attack in a big data system shall
modify or delete all copies of a data block residing at primary and replica nodes. Such an attack
needs cluster level information about all storage locations of the data block which can only be
retrieved from the namenode. A more probable attack scenario is to compromise a single data
node. In such a case, an attack attempt can be identified by performing simple comparison on
data elements such as instruction stack, data stack and APS among primary copy and its replicas.
From a security standpoint, a regular communication channel between the infiltrated node and the
unaffected replicas is not fully secure. Hence, a communication protocol that uses the dedicated
hardware is proposed for secure communication among replica nodes. Similar to other on-board
hardware security chips such as TPM chip by TCG[137], the idea is to provide secure keys which
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Figure 4.2: Communication Protocol in the Proposed Framework.
can be used to establish dedicated communication channels among nodes. A unique harcoded master
key that will be used to generate all public-private key pairs for data encryption and decryption.
Once the DOC of a process is analyzed, the proposed framework computes an APS associated to
the process. For complete security, every process in the system is evaluated.
Next, process analysis information of the process under suspicion is shared securely with
other replicas to confirm or deny an attack. A packet for this process is created on the node with
the primary copy of data which contains the instruction stack, data stack and APS of the process.
The packet is encrypted with a private key and the associated public key is shared with the replicas.
This public-private key pair is unique to a node. Periodically updating the public-private key pair
of a node is a design decision open to the users.
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From figure 4.2, it can be noticed that the proposed framework mainly contains 4 parts:
static memory for lookup tables, dynamic memory for data and instruction stacks, TPM chip that
can generate keys and finally a processor to take care of process monitoring and secure communi-
cation. It can be observed from figure 4.2 that the proposed framework works in parallel (dotted
lines) with the primary processors of a big data system. The figure shows how the communication
protocol fits in a common workflow of a hadoop cluster. First, the namenode receives a job request
proc1 from the users to which three identical jobs proc1.1, proc1.2 and proc1.3 are scheduled by
the namenode on three data nodes that host the required data and replicas in the hadoop cluster.
These regular communication channels are indicated by solid red lines in figure 4.2. When using
the proposed framework, these processes undergo process analysis at data nodes and packets of
information about the processes are created in case of an attack suspicion. For secure transfer of
those packets within the associated replicas in the cluster, the primary data node shares public keys
represented by pub1 with the replica data nodes. Each data node also shares another set of public
keys represented by pub2 with the namenode for secure data node to namenode communication.
The pub2 keys are used in case of complete attacks and recovery steps.
This algorithm runs inside the custom coprocessor hardware as soon as a packet is received
from replica. The idea behind this algorithm is to perform a simple comparison that runs at multiple
levels for optimization. For example, if the size of instruction stack received does not match the size
of corresponding local instruction stack, then the algorithm confirms the attack without checking
the contents of the stacks. Depending on result from this algorithm, either the process is evaluated
as a safe program or necessary recovery actions are to be taken. For this work, steps for attack
recovery were not explored because they depend on various system, data and user choices.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for attack confirmation on replicas
Require: Data packet from replica node
while Packet from replica do
packet is decrypted with public key;
instruction stack, data stack and APS are recovered;
if APS are same then
if stack sizes are same then
if instruction stack are same then
if data stack are same then
everything alright;
else
process data is modified;
else
process instructions are modified;
else
process is modified or not same;
else
process is attacked;
4.2.2 Experimental Results
In this section, the setup and design of the experiments and their results are discussed in
detail. Most security approaches account for slowdown but with the proposed framework, there is
no slowdown in the processing of jobs due to its independent and on-the-fly nature. Hence, the
overhead of having additional hardware is measured in terms of parameters such as time, cpu and
memory.
Workflow of the proposed framework is dependent on the data hosted by nodes and inde-
pendent to the job execution cycle. This makes it easy to setup the test environment because only a
small subset of the cluster is required to test the end-to-end workflow of the framework. A hadoop
cluster of three virtual nodes was established to test the overhead due to the proposed framework.
This three-virtual-node hadoop cluster represents a big data system with replication factor of three
i.e. primary node and two replicas. Table 4.2 shows the hardware and software configuration of
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Table 4.2: Node Configuration.
Name Value
Processor AMD A8-6500 APU @ 3.49GHz (1 Core)
Motherboard Oracle VirtualBox v1.2
Chipset Intel 440FX- 82441FX PMC
Memory 3072MB
Disk 215GB VBOX HDD
Graphics InnoTek VirtualBox
Network Intel 82540EM Gigabit
OS CentOS 6.4
Kernel 2.6.32− 358.el6.x8664(x8664)
Compiler GCC 4.4.7 20120313
File-System ext4
System Layer VirtualBox 4.2.16
a node used in the virtual hadoop cluster setup. The proposed framework was tested against 14
benchmark tests that represent memory, processor and system tests. These tests belong to the cpu
and crypto suite from Phoronix Test Suite benchmarks[138]. Experiments were designed to first
create a baseline using an existing big data system and and then check the overhead of using the
proposed framework on the same system.
First, a baseline is created by running the cpu and crypto benchmarks of Phoronix Test
Suite on the cluster. The list of 14 tests used to test the proposed framework, along with their
metrics, results and characteristics are given in table 4.3. Columns execution, memory and % cpu
together talk about the characteristics of baseline. The tests are listed in increasing order of code
size. To emulate workflow of a big data system, these tests are run in sequence on the virtual cluster
i.e. first on the primary node and then on the replicas.
Assembly code of the 14 benchmark tests was obtained by disassembling their executable
files. These assembly files are then given as input to the proposed framework for analysis and attack
identification. For convenience, the communication protocol uses basic XOR for packet encryption
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and decryption. TCP was used for communication among the replicas. The framework considers
all benchmark tests as potential threats and runs the algorithms on all of them. The lookup tables
used to calculate APS used table 4.1 on a predefined list of control flow instructions (given below)
and APS values of each of these instructions was set to three. Control flow instructions used are:
• Branch: bt, bts, btr, bswap
• Jump: js, je, jne, jmp, jmpq, ja, jae, jb, jbe, jg, jge, jl, jle, jns, jp, jnp, jo, jno, jrcxz
• Other: call, ret
Results of each test in the baseline are given in table 4.3. These results are also uploaded to
the openbenchmark website. The metrics and average result column are generated by the benchmark
suite. For this work though, the focus is on the cpu, memory and time statistics of the tests in the
benchmark suite as they represent the characteristics of the benchmarks. It can be noticed that
the crypto and cpu benchmark tests used in experiments have varying cpu usage (between 35% to
99%). Also, the execution time of these tests varies from low (12 seconds) to high (740 seconds).
This variation in time and processing needs of the benchmarks is intentional because an important
goals of the proposed framework is to be generic and hence cannot be tested on adhoc experiments.
Columns of table 4.3 starting from column %CFI characterize the overhead of using the
proposed framework. The %CFI column shows the significance of control flow instructions in a
program. It can be noticed here that control flow instructions typically factor for 10% of the total
instructions in a benchmark test. The APS column is derived from %CFI column. Each CFI was
given an APS value of 3 and Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are used to calculate the values. The next
column i.e. Packet size shows the size of encrypted messages transferred in the network during
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the runtime of the proposed framework. This column indicates the network overhead of using the
framework on top of a big data system. Since packets contain all information about control flow
instructions in a program, their size is proportional to the previous column, %CFI in a benchmark
test. One interesting learning from this result is to contemplate the idea of using the framework at
function level instead of process level to reduce the packet size.
4.2.3 Analysis of Algorithm and Results
Analysis of algorithm is focused on the limitations of the proposed approach. As mentioned
in the previous sections, the rule engine and the APS scoring mechanism used in this technique
are premature. Also, this technique can only be applied in homogenous clusters where nodes use
the same instruction set architecture. There is no scope for false positives but that is under that
assumptions made about attacks and the insiders in the attack model.
Analysis of results is focused on measuring the overhead due to the proposed approach. Time
measurements are extremely important when estimating overhead in big data systems. Analysis
and confirmation columns of table 4.3 show time consumption of the proposed framework for local
process analysis and attack confirmation respectively. It can be noticed from the graph in figure
4.3a that the time required to analyze a process DOC is negligible compared to execution time. The
horizontal blue line running along the x-axis of figure 4.3a represents this. The time for network
transfer is not included here because it depends on the transfer capacity of the network. The time
required for replicas to confirm (or deny) an attack by comparing the packet information with local
copy is marginally low when compared to its analysis counterpart. The same can be observed from
the graph in figure 4.3b. The horizontal red line running along the x-axis of figure 4.3b represents
this. The main reason for such low values in confirmation time is because of multi-level decision
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Table 4.3: Phoronix Test Suite Benchmark Results.
Baseline Proposed Framework
No. BenchmarkTest
Execution Memory %
CPU
%
CFI
APS Packet
size
Analysis Consensus %
Over-
head
(seconds) (mb) (mb) (seconds) (seconds)
1 Stream 12 1023 40% 5% -0.89 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.001
2 C-Ray 322 1011 98% 9% -0.64 0.012 0.02 0.02 0.0001
3 Smallpt 740 665 99% 5% -0.89 0.017 0.01 0.03 0.00005
4 Himeno
Bench-
mark
65 1029 89% 8% -0.68 0.026 0.02 0.02 0.0006
5 Apache
Bench-
mark
172 1116 95% 13% -0.49 0.054 0.02 0.03 0.0002
6 TSCP 20 1026 35% 14% -0.48 0.079 0.02 0.02 0.002
7 Parallel
BZIP2
Compres-
sion
59 946 85% 13% -0.5 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.003
8 FLAC
Audio
Encoding
14 729 75% 14% -0.48 0.42 0.22 0.03 0.01
9 John The
Ripper
70 1026 92% 9% -0.63 0.6 0.37 0.04 0.006
10 LAME
MP3
Encoding
23 729 82% 10% -0.61 0.89 0.46 0.05 0.02
11 Crafty 124 670 94% 7% -0.76 1.35 1.06 0.07 0.009
12 7-Zip
Compres-
sion
40 1015 82% 13% -0.5 2.95 1.4 0.12 0.03
13 Graphics
Magick
62 1028 89% 12% -0.53 4.88 2.54 0.18 0.04
14 OpenSSL 22 730 72% 11% -0.55 6.82 2.77 0.23 0.13
Average Values 121 910 81% 10% -0.6 1.30 0.65 0.06 0.017
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Figure 4.3: Time Overhead for APS Technique.
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making and using separate instruction and data stacks. But the most interesting observation from
these tests is that the time taken by the framework to determine whether a process is attacked or
not. This is calculated by adding the values for analysis and confirmation; and dividing the result
with the execution time. The average time taken by the proposed framework to detect an attack
is 0.01% of the time required to complete the corresponding benchmark test. Also, on average,
the proposed framework uses 85% of the cpu for process analysis and 94% of the cpu for attack
confirmation.
4.3 Technique Based on Control Flow Graphs Analysis
Though the central theme to all the proposed compile-time techniques is to reduce the
amount of work needed to analyze a program binary, the two techniques proposed until now are
heuristic in nature. In this approach of detecting attacks based on Control Flow Graph (CFG)
analysis, the problem of graph isomorphism to check CFG similarity is handled using a heuristic
approach.
4.3.1 Proposed Methodology
The first step in this technique involves capturing the control-flow of a process running on a
datanode of the big data system. This is realized by converting a CFG to a set of Minimum Spanning
Trees (MST). The second step involves process-level similarity check followed by consensus among
replica datanodes. The similarity check in this case involves an exhaustive matching among sets of
MSTs.
In this work, the emphasis is on process level intrusion detection by observing coherence in
the behavior of duplicate processes running on replica datanodes of a distributed big data system.
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Figure 4.4: Proposed Algorithm for Intrusion Detection Using Process Signatures.
To capture the program behavior, the first step is to identify a representation of the program that
has the required information and filters out all other data. Such representation is called the program
signature. Since the goal is to identify intrusions from control-flow mismatch, program signatures
should contain all possible control flow information of a program.
Compiled source code of a program is generally used to generate static CFG. Since most
big data frameworks use a virtual machine (such as JVM), an instruction level CFG in this context
is generated from java byte code. In this work, disassembled object code (DOC) from java byte
code is used as input to generate the CFG at instruction level. It is important for the program
signature to contain only the information that is necessary. Hence, every CFG is converted into
a set of MSTs that are later used to generate the program signature. In this work, the idea of
representing a program by a set of MSTs/MSAs is proposed. Such a set of MSTs can be extracted
from a byte-level CFG using Edmonds algorithm. This set of MSTs that are extracted from a CFG
are further filtered to only the set of edge-disjoint MSTs. There are many versions proposed for
Edmonds algorithm [96, 97, 98] and for this work a version from NetworkX graph library [139] is
used that generates edge disjoint spanning trees from the root vertex of a given digraph. Once a
minimal representation of the logic in a program is obtained in the form of an MSA, it is converted
into a string which is in accordance to the DOT format representation.
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The length of a MST string in DOT format is dependent on program size because DOT
format is given by listing all the nodes of MSA followed by the edges. To make the comparison
step faster, the variable length MST strings of a program are converted to fixed length strings using
hashing. The extracted set of edge-disjoint MSTs are hashed using popular hashing algorithms such
as SHA or MD5 to generate a set of fixed-length hash strings. Since a sparse graph such as CFG
can have multiple MSAs, the program signature can be a single hash string or a set of hash strings.
Having all possible MSAs in the program signature makes the graph similarity check more reliable.
In the end, a program signature is a set of fixed-length strings.
Program signatures are encrypted before being shared with replica datanodes for tighter
security. The private key for encryption is generated from a harcoded master key of secure hardware,
similar to the idea proposed previously [19]. Every datanode in a big data system runs the proposed
profiling method for every running process and it includes all the steps involved in converting the
compiled binary of a program to its program signature. A pictorial representation of the steps in
profiling method is given in Figure 4.4.
Replication property of big data systems opens scope for new methods of implementing
application logic level IDS techniques. Process similarity check among duplicate nodes of the cluster
helps in checking for coherence among the replica datanodes while performing a write or read
operation. When a process is scheduled to run on a datanode that hosts the primary copy of a data,
a signature for that process is created by the profiling method (Step 1) of the proposed IDS technique
and that signature string is shared with all replica datanodes. In the matching method (Step 2),
these signatures received from other datanodes are decrypted and matched with the local versions
of the same process. The results are shared with all other replica datanodes for consensus. For
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secure communication among datanodes, the same communication protocol is used that is proposed
in the security framework.
A crucial part of the matching method is to check for similarity (or dissimilarity) between
two program signatures. Generally, graph similarity check can be performed by checking node
similarity and edge similarity. The following points are considered while comparing MSTs to check
for similarity among programs:
• MSTs are sparse graphs obtained from byte-level CFGs. Hence, checking for path sensitivity
is not exponential.
• All edges are assumed to have the same weight of 1.
• The total number of MSTs for a CFG is limited (by Cayley’s formula [140]).
• According to Edmond’s theorem, a graph which is k-connected always has k edge-disjoint
arborescences.
• Two MSTs are a perfect match if their node sets and edge sets match exactly.
• If edge set of one MST is a subset of the edge set of another MST, the source graphs of these
MSTs are not similar.
• Two graphs are similar if for every MST in one graph there exists a perfect match in the set
of MSTs of the other graph.
• Hashing algorithms such as SHA1 or MD5 are quick and efficient.
Based on the points listed above, the following method is developed for graph similarity
check. Let us consider 2 control-flow graphs G1 and G2. Let (N1, E1) represent G1 where N1 is
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the node set of the graph G1 and E1 is the edge set of the graph. Similarly, (N2, E2) represents
G2 where N2 is the node set of the graph G1 and E2 is the edge set of the graph. Assume that
M1 [(N1, E1′)] is the set of MST/MSA for G1 and M2 [(N2, E2′)] is the set of MST/MSA for
G2 obtained after applying a variation of Edmonds algorithm on these CFGs (such as finding all
edge-disjoint MSTs). In order to check for similarity in both graphs G1 and G2, a perfect match in
M2 for all MSTs in M1 is required. To simplify the match function, a hash function is used on M1
and M2 that creates a unique hash for every MST. Let H1 be a set of hashes generated from M1
and H2 be the set of hashes from M2. If any hash in H1 does not exist in H2, it can be deduced
that the graphs are not equal.
4.3.2 Experimental Results
In this section, the experimental setup and experiments used for testing the proposed tech-
nique are provided. The results and some analysis are also provided.
An Amazon EC2 [141] m4.xlarge instance running Ubuntu 14.04 is used to generate MSTs
(and their hashes) from CFGs using SageMath. The proposed technique was implemented and
tested on an Amazon EC2 big data cluster of 5 t2.micro nodes - 1 master node, 1 secondary master
node and 3 datanodes with a replication factor of 3. The list of softwares used in conducting the
experiments are:
• SageMath [142] is a free open-source mathematics software system for mathematical calcula-
tions.
• GraphML [143] is a popular graph representation format which can used to represent both
CFG and MST.
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• Graphviz [144] is open source graph visualization software that takes input in DOT format
and makes diagrams in useful formats.
• NetworkX [139] is a Python language software package that provides graph algorithms such
as Edmonds and VF2.
• Control-flow graph factory [145] is a software that generates CFGs from java bytecode (class
file) and exports them to GraphML or DOT formats.
The proposed intrusion detection technique was tested using 16 hadoop MapReduce ex-
amples that can be found in all hadoop distributions. These examples cover a wide range of big
data applications as listed in Table 4.6. The class files of these examples are readily available
in the hadoop distributions. First, control-flow graph factory [145] was used to generate control
flow graphs from the class files. These graphs are stored in graphml format and given as input to
a simple SageMath [142] script that uses NetworkX library [139] and computes the edge-disjoint
MSAs and hashes them using MD5. A C++ application was used to implement encryption and
secure communication needed for the proposed IDS technique. The implementation was based on
framework from [19]. Since the hashes are fixed length strings, a basic numeric key based left/right
shift is sufficient for encryption/decryption of messages. Some of the MapReduce examples that do
not have set benchmarks were executed with minimum input requirements.
Table 4.4, Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show the results of the experiments. Figure 4.5a shows
the comparison between the time taken to run the Hadoop MapReduce examples on a big data
cluster and the time taken to run the proposed intrusion detection technique. The execution times
for some examples (represented by * in table 4.4) are inconsistent among multiple runs. It can be
noticed from table 4.4 that only 0.81% of time taken to execute an example is needed to analyze
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(a) Proposed IDS Technique and Run-time for MapReduce Examples.
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(b) Profiling and Matching Methods of the Proposed IDS Technique.
Figure 4.5: Execution Time Analysis of CFG Technique.
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Table 4.4: Program-Level Time Metrics of Hadoop MapReduce Examples (in Seconds)
E.No Example Profile
Method
CFG
to
MSA
set
Hash
Method
Match
Method
Avg.
Hash
Match
Conse-
nsus
Total
Time
Exec.
Time
%
Over-
head
1 word mean 0.0216 0.0216 7.89E-
05
0.0190 0.0002 0.0187 0.0407 6.988 0.58%
2 pentomino 0.0288 0.0288 8.70E-
05
0.0196 0.0013 0.0182 0.0485 4.914 0.99%
3 distributed
bbp*
0.0567 0.0567 6.29E-
05
0.0150 0.0019 0.0130 0.0718 28.58 0.25%
4 aggregate
wordcount
0.0070 0.007 5.70E-
05
0.0145 0.0002 0.0143 0.0215 19.002 0.11%
5 secondary
sort*
0.0199 0.0199 5.10E-
05
0.0072 0.0018 0.0054 0.0272 11.657 0.23%
6 aggregate
word
histogram
0.0066 0.0066 4.20E-
05
0.0135 0.0012 0.0122 0.0201 18.024 0.11%
7 random
writer
0.2561 0.2561 8.58E-
05
0.0217 0.0025 0.0191 0.2779 29.111 0.95%
8 tera vali-
date
0.0181 0.0181 5.20E-
05
0.0169 0.0001 0.0168 0.0351 5.958 0.59%
9 qmc* 0.0238 0.0238 7.39E-
05
0.0202 0.0015 0.0186 0.0440 11.657 0.38%
10 word stan-
dard devi-
ation
0.0193 0.0193 7.89E-
05
0.0098 0.0021 0.0076 0.0292 7.112 0.41%
11 word me-
dian
0.0312 0.0312 6.20E-
05
0.0208 0.0020 0.0187 0.0520 7.028 0.73%
12 bbp 0.0415 0.0415 9.08E-
05
0.0118 0.0003 0.0115 0.0534 6.865 0.78%
13 tera gen 0.0169 0.0169 5.51E-
05
0.0131 0.0023 0.0108 0.0301 4.905 0.61%
14 sudoku* 0.0177 0.0177 5.60E-
05
0.0156 0.0006 0.0150 0.0334 11.657 0.29%
15 wordcount 0.3672 0.3672 6.99E-
05
0.0221 0.0023 0.0197 0.3893 7.034 5.54%
16 multifile
wordcount
0.0159 0.0159 5.20E-
05
0.0118 0.0001 0.0116 0.0277 5.963 0.47%
Average Values 0.0593 0.0592 6.59E-
05
0.0158 0.0013 0.0144 0.07516 11.657 0.81%
it for intrusion detection. The time needed to run the proposed detection technique includes (a)
time taken to create CFG for the main method from the class file; (b) time taken to extract MST
set from CFG; (c) time taken to hash the MSTs and encrypt them and; (d) time taken to check for
similarity among duplicate processes by comparing the program signatures.
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4.3.3 Analysis of Algorithm and Results
It can be noticed from Figure 4.5b that the time required by the proposed technique is
influenced by the profiling method trying to extract MSAs from CFG, particularly when there are
more than one MSAs for a CFG. Though the matching method performance is directly proportional
to the square of the size of the number of edge-disjoint MSAs in a CFG i.e. O(n2) worst case
complexity, it can be observed that it is rare to have more than a couple of edge-disjoint MSAs in
a CFG because of the sparse nature of CFG.
4.4 Technique Based on Control Instruction Sequence Analysis
As mentioned before, the central theme to all compile-time techniques proposed in this
work is to reduce the amount of work needed to analyze a program binary. In this approach
of detecting attacks based on Control Instruction Sequence (CIS) analysis, a program binary is
uniquely represented by preserving the order of control-flow instructions in the disassembled object
code. To simplify the verification step, each process is represented by a hash that is obtained from
the CIS of that process.
4.4.1 Proposed Methodology
The attack detection algorithm based on CIS is a two step process: process profiling (step
1) and consensus through hash matching (step 2).
Traditionally vulnerability scanning is performed away from the source program’s execution
domain to guarantee isolation. Hence, the results of such scans must be communicated back to
the program. But this leads to a cost versus isolation trade-off, depending on the remoteness of
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Algorithm 4 Process Profiling
procedure Process Profile
while true do
procnew ← get newly scheduled process
code← get assembly code from HotSpotV M(procnew)
for instr ∈ code do
if instr ∈ jump then
seqjump ← add instr to sequence of jumps
if instr ∈ call then
seqcall ← add instr to sequence of calls
if instr ∈ return then
seqreturn ← add instr to sequence of returns
seqarray ← add seqjump
seqarray ← add seqcall
seqarray ← add seqreturn
for seq ∈ seqarray do
hashseq ← get hash from sha(seq)
hashhashes ← add hashseq
msg ← get hash from sha(hashhashes)
send msg using Secure Communication Protocol
the location used to perform the vulnerability scan. In big data applications, the source program’s
execution is distributed across multiple nodes of the cluster. This makes it difficult to use techniques
such as vulnerability scans because of the additional communication and synchronization involved.
Hence it is imperative to look at properties of big data frameworks that can be exploited to provide
security. For example, big data infrastructures use replication of data for high availability. Con-
sistency requiremnets enforce the same program to be run on multiple nodes that host the data
required for the program. This unique property of big data systems is used to propose a novel
process profiling technique which is a variation of CFI and can help in detecting insider attacks
within the big data system. Evans et al. [110] show that CFI, either with limited number of tags
or unlimited number of tags, is not completely effective in attack prevention because it is context
insensitive. Also, CFI is usually based on CFG created from static analysis of program code.
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During the initial days of big data, applications were packaged as jars that run on Java
Virtual Machines (JVM). These jars are not completely compiled and do not convey much about
the program they represent. Hence, in this work CFI is not used for CFG’s created using statistical
code analysis. Instead, the control structure of a program is built from the corresponding JVM
output i.e. the assembly code of the Hotspot VM that hosts the JVM. Since this is considered the
final run-time code that gets executed on the hardware, the control structure generated from the
output of Hotspot VM is expected to be less susceptible to software attacks compared to a CFG
generated from statistical analysis of program code. In the context of big data platforms, this
mitigates the possibility of launching an attack on the entire cluster. Another major variation from
CFI in this process profiling technique is to use individual control flow instruction sequences instead
of CFG paths. Control instructions dictate the control flow in a program. Generating instruction
sequences of such control flow instructions from the assembly code output of Hotspot VM should
technically give us all information a CFG can provide in this context and avoid the complexity
involved in generating a CFG. Technically, the graph matching problem is converted to a much
simpler string matching problem. Of course, newer big data applications are moving away from
using JVMs to other programming domains such as python and we have not covered them in this
work.
The analyzer module in the proposed system creates instruction sequences for jumps, calls
and returns from the JVM output of a given program (based on Intel’s Instruction Set Architecture).
Then, the SHA cryptographic hash function module is used to generate a fixed-length output for
each of the three instruction sequences. All three hashes are combined and again given to the SHA
cryptographic hash function module to generate a final hash for the program. This hash of hashes
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Algorithm 5 Hash Matching
procedure Hash Match
while true do
msgp ← get message about process p from main copy
hashhashes(receivedp)← decrypt(msgnew, privk)
hashhashes(localp)← process− profile(p)
if hashhashes(receivedp) ∈ hashhashes(localp) then
confirmation← safe
else
confirmation← unsafe
send(confirmation,main)
strengthens the uniqueness in identifying a program. All programs that run on every node in the
cluster will follow the same routine. Encryption module of the node with the primary copy of data
uses currently active public keys of replica nodes to encrypt the hash of hashes and send it to the
associated replica node. Hence, this node acts as the coordinator for performing step 2 in the attack
detection algorithm.
Algorithm 4 shows the steps involved in the proposed process profiling step. This algorithm
will be running independently in the analyzer module of all machines in the big data cluster. Every
process output, procnew, from the HotSpot VM is grabbed by the analyzer module of the proposed
system and profiled based on the control flow instructions present in its assembly code. Line by
line analysis of procnew is conducted and each instruction instr is matched with the set of control
flow instructions available in the instruction set of the processor architecture. For this work, only
the most prominent control flow instructions of Intel’s x86 architecture are used: jumps, calls and
returns. When an instr in the code of the procnew is a control flow instruction, it gets added
to the corresponding sequence string. The seqarray represents the array of individual control flow
instruction sequences in the process procnew. This array is used later as input while generating the
hashes for each control sequence string. All fixed length hash outputs are combined as hashhashes and
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1. Process Profiling
(locally)
3. Hash Matching
(locally)
2. Secure Exchange of
Encrypted Messages
4. Consensus
msg
notify
Figure 4.6: Steps Involved in Attack Detection using CIS Technique.
rehashed to generate a final hash called msg that represents the program. This msg is then shared
with all replicas running the same program using the secure communication protocol described
above.
The next step in the attack detection algorithm is a consensus algorithm similar to the
extended 2-phase commit protocol [146]. In this step, the node with primary copy of data acts as
coordinator and requests all replica nodes, that act as workers, to confirm if their local hash of hashes,
(msg) of a particular process matches exactly with the coordinator’s version. The coordinator then
decides on the safety of the process depending on the acknowledgments received from participating
replica nodes. A process is considered to be safe by the coordinator if and only if it receives safe
acknowledgments from all of the workers. At the end of process profiling step, encrypted message
msge is shared by coordinator node with all worker nodes. The nodes that receive such messages will
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Algorithm 6 Consensus
procedure Get Consensus
for node ∈ replicas do
confirmationnode ← get confirmation about process p from replica
if confirmationnode ∈ safe then
countsafe ← countsafe + 1
if countsafe ∈ countreplicas then
attack ← no
else
attack ← yes
masternode ← recovery(p)
decrypt the message with their currently active private key. The decrypted message is essentially
the hash of hashes of the three control instruction sequence strings. This decrypted hash of hashes
can be directly compared to the local version of the same process to detect the possibility of an
attack.
If the result of such comparison of strings is a perfect match, then that indicates that the
same process (with the same code) was run on both nodes. This indicates a safe process unless
both nodes of the cluster are attacked the same way, in which case it will be a false positive. A
confirmation message about the result of the hash comparison will be sent to the coordinator node
as response to the original incoming message. The coordinator node will wait to receive responses
from all replicas in order to arrive at a conclusion about the possibility of an attack in a process.
The given big data system is safe as long as all the replicas respond with a safe confirmation. A
single unsafe response will mean that the system is under attack. Algorithms 5 and 6 give more
details about the hash matching and consensus steps that take place in step 2 of the attack detection
algorithm. A pictorial representation of the steps involved in the 2-step attack detection algorithm
is given in Figure 4.6. This figure represents a big data system with a replication factor of 3 and
hence there is one coordinator (represented with a dark black shadow below the node) and two
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workers. Active communication channels are represented using a dotted line while the regular lines
between nodes represent passive communication channel. The blue dotted loop around each node
in step 1 and 3 of the figure represent local computations.
Algorithm 5 is used in the hash matching step of the attack detection algorithm. When a
worker node, nodek receives msgp from the coordinator node about a process p, it will decrypt that
message using its current private key, privk and stores the result as hashhashes(receivedp). The local
version of the same string i.e. hashhashes(localp) will be compared against the hashhashes(receivedp)
to identify similarity between local and received hash of a process. The result of this hash matching
is sent back as confirmation to the coordinator node, main. The value of confirmation is safe in
case of a perfect match of hashes and unsafe otherwise.
Algorithm 6 is used by the coordinator node to identify an attack, with the help of worker
nodes. After step 1, the coordinator node waits for responses from all the recipients. The worker
nodes respond with a confirmation message that says whether the process is safe or unsafe. If
the count of number of safe responses i.e. countsafe from worker nodes matches with the count of
number of nodes in the replica set i.e. countreplicas, the coordinator node assumes that there is no
attack in the current process p and resets the attack variable. Else, if a mismatch in the process
analysis is observed, the attack variable is set and the masternode is notified about the possibility
of an attack in process p.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
In this section the experimental setup is described; details about the choice of experiments
are explained; and the results and their analysis are presented. The hadoop security design specifies
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that a 3% slowdown in performance is permissible for any newly proposed security solutions [75].
Hence, it is important for the proposed system to offer both theoretical correctness and feasibility in
practical implementation and usage. Security in big data systems is a new area that does not have
set standards and specifically designed open-source benchmarks to evaluate the overhead. Hence,
a set of general big data benchmark programs that are relevant and provided by the big data
community were handpicked to test the efficiency of the proposed security system. The 3 big data
services used for experiments are:
• Hadoop [8], the most popular implementation of a big data framework that is maintained
by the Apache open-source community. It allows storing and processing of large date using
programming models such as MapReduce.
• Spark [9], a fast and general engine for large-scale data processing that is supposedly much
faster than Hadoop and it is maintained by the Apache open-source community as well.
• Amazon web services (AWS) [141, 147, 148], a perfect example of real-world big data sys-
tem. AWS provides Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) service that allows users to use Amazon
cloud’s compute capacity depending on their needs. EC2 presents a true virtual computing
environment. Storage for the EC2 nodes is provided by Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS)
which offers persistent storage. EBS volumes are automatically replicated to protect user from
component failure, offering high availability and durability.
AWS supported hadoop and spark clusters were used for conducting the experiments. The
Hadoop Cluster is a 5 node cluster built using basic t2.micro nodes of Amazon EC2 and EBS. Each
node is equipped with only 1 vCPU and 1GB memory. The network performance is minimal for this
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Table 4.5: Amazon EC2 Instance Types
Attribute Value
Instance Model t2.micro m1.large
Processor Intel Xeon with Turbo Intel Xeon E5-2650
Compute Units 1 (Burstable) 4
vCPU 1 2
Memory (GB) 1 7.5
Storage (SSD) Elastic Block Store Elastic Block Store
Networking Performance low moderate
Operating System Linux/UNIX Linux/UNIX
Hadoop distribution 2.7.1 2.7.1
Spark distribution N/A 1.6
cluster. The Spark Cluster is a 4 node cluster built using general purpose m1.large nodes of Amazon
EC2 and EBS. Each node is equipped with 2 vCPU and 7.5GB memory. Network performance is
moderate for this cluster. Both cluster configurations satisfy the minimum requirement to support
replication factor of 3. The hardware and software configurations of the EC2 nodes can be found
in table 4.5. A 64-bit Ubuntu AMI (Amazon Machine Instance) is built for each node-type before
setting up the clusters. These AMIs were equipped with the latest distributions of Hadoop, Spark
and GCC along with with our code base. The hadoop cluster had 5 nodes, where 1 node acted as
the namenode, 1 node acted as the secondary name node and 3 nodes were acting as data nodes.
The spark cluster had a master and 3 slave nodes. Since the proposed system works independently,
all modules of the model had to be installed on every node of the EC2 clusters. A library of
all modules in the model was implemented in C++ programming language using STL and multi-
threading libraries and packaged together. Our code used TCP/IP protocol and SSH keys for
communication between the nodes of the clusters.
Though the main requirement for any attack detection service is to be able to detect an
attack successfully, it is also necessary to be able to detect the attack before the attacked program
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Table 4.6: List of Hadoop MapReduce Examples
No. Name Description
1 aggregate word
count
An Aggregate-based map/reduce program that counts the words in
the input files.
2 aggregate
wordhist
An Aggregate-based map/reduce program that computes the
histogram of the words in the input files.
3 bbp A map/reduce program that uses Bailey-Borwein-Plouffe to
compute exact digits of Pi.
4 distbbp A map/reduce program that uses a BBP-type formula to compute
exact bits of Pi.
5 grep A map/reduce program that counts the matches of a regex in the
input.
6 pi A map/reduce program that estimates Pi using a quasi-Monte
Carlo method.
7 random text
writer
A map/reduce program that writes 10GB of random textual data
per node.
8 random writer A map/reduce program that writes 10GB of random data per node.
9 sort A map/reduce program that sorts the data written by the random
writer.
10 teragen Generate data for the terasort.
11 terasort Run the terasort.
12 teravalidate Check the results of the terasort.
13 word count A map/reduce program that counts the words in the input files.
14 word mean A map/reduce program that counts the average length of the
words in the input files.
15 word median A map/reduce program that counts the median length of the
words in the input files.
16 word standard
deviation
A map/reduce program that counts the standard deviation of the
length of the words in the input files.
completes execution. Hence, the efficiency as well as the overhead of the proposed system are shown
by conducting the experiments in real-time using a selected set of popular examples and tests form
the big data community. Two sets of open source big data benchmark programs are used in this
work: (a) 16 Hadoop MapReduce Examples that are provided in the Apache hadoop installation kit;
and (b) 16 Spark-perf MLlib Tests for machine learning algorithms given in the spark performance
test suite by Databricks [149]. More details about these examples and tests are given in tables 4.6
and 4.7.
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Table 4.7: List of Spark-Perf MLlib Tests
No. Name Description
1 fp-growth Frequent Pattern Matching Tests to find frequent item sets
2 word2vec Feature Transformation Tests for distributed presentation of
words
3 chi-sq-feature Statistic Toolkit Tests using Chi-square for correlation
4 spearman Statistic Toolkit Tests using Spearman’s Correlation
5 pearson Statistic Toolkit Tests using Pearson’s Correlation
6 block-matrix-
mult
Matrix Multiplication on distributed matrix
7 summary-
statistics
Linear Algebra Tests using Summary Statistics (min, max, ...)
8 pca Linear Algebra Tests using Principal Component Analysis
9 svd Linear Algebra Tests using Singular Value Decomposition
10 gmm Clustering Tests using Gaussian Mixture Model
11 kmeans Clustering Tests using K-Means clustering
12 als Recommendation Tests using Alternating Least Squares
13 decision-tree Random Forest Decision Tree
14 naive-bayes Classification Tests using Naive Bayes
15 glm-classification Generalized Linear Classification Model
16 glm-regression Generalized Linear Regression Model
The input to the model (built from the proposed system) is the run-time assembly code of
a program. The Hadoop MapReduce examples were coded in Java and the Spark-perf MLlib tests
were coded in Scala. So, the jars to run these examples were built using just-in-time compiling.
Their bytecodes are insufficient to create the assembly codes of the individual programs. A software
called jit-watch [150] is used to generate the assembly codes (Intel x86 specification) of the programs
from the jars. Since the proposed technique only needs control-flow instructions from the generated
assembly code outputs of each program, a custom parser is used that can filter out control flow
instructions from the native files. All 32 example programs are infected by a code snippet that
calls a function foo to print a line to the console and involves a total of 3 call instructions and 1
return instruction. The command used for generating assembly code output of JVM (or Hotspot
VM) when running the program is:
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java -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions -XX:+PrintAssembly -XX:PrintAssemblyOptions=int
el -XX:+TraceClassLoading -XX:+LogCompilation -XX:LogFile=filename -cp [path to
more classes] [main method] [args]
First, the execution times for the Hadoop MapReduce examples on the hadoop cluster were
measured. Then the run times of the implemented model, while it was analyzing the assembly codes
of the driver programs of the same examples, were studied. These experiments are adhoc because the
input arguments for some of the experiments were intentionally low to simulate worst case scenarios
where the process takes very less time to execute. Data is required for some of the MapReduce
examples to execute. To meet such input data requirements of the MapReduce examples, the
configuration file data from etc folder of the Hadoop installation is put into the Hadoop database
(HDFS). The generic command used to run these MapReduce examples and measure the time taken
is given as :
time hadoop jar hadoop-mapreduce-examples.jar [main method] [args]
The spark-perf MLlib tests on the spark cluster were conducted the same way the MapRe-
duce examples were tested. But here the inputs for the tests were predetermined by the benchmark
provider in the config.py script. The generic command used to run these MLlib tests is:
spark-submit –class mllib.perf.TestRunner –master [ip of node] –driver-memory
[limit] mllib-perf-tests-assembly.jar [algorithm name] [args]
4.4.3 Analysis of Algorithm and Results
The experiments used for evaluating the proposed security system comprise of stress tests
and performance benchmarks of Hadoop and Spark. Hence, knowing which threads of investigation
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Table 4.8: Instruction-Level Properties of Hadoop MapReduce Examples
E.no Example IC CFI Jumps Calls Returns %
CFI
%
Jumps
%
Calls
% Re-
turns
1 aggregate
word
count
81713 17195 12722 4009 464 21.04% 15.57% 4.91% 0.57%
2 aggregate
word hist
48428 9812 7133 2366 313 20.26% 14.73% 4.89% 0.65%
3 bbp 85514 17880 13182 4211 487 20.91% 15.42% 4.92% 0.57%
4 dist bbp 68283 13880 10234 3238 408 20.33% 14.99% 4.74% 0.60%
5 grep 81404 16911 12501 3937 473 20.77% 15.36% 4.84% 0.58%
6 pi 65397 13607 10170 3070 367 20.81% 15.55% 4.69% 0.56%
7 random
text writer
70909 14896 11186 3332 378 21.01% 15.78% 4.70% 0.53%
8 random
writer
91414 19462 14508 4475 479 21.29% 15.87% 4.90% 0.52%
9 sort 101298 21420 16003 4885 532 21.15% 15.80% 4.82% 0.53%
10 tera gen 134747 28228 21013 6516 699 20.95% 15.59% 4.84% 0.52%
11 tera sort 121541 25420 18925 5827 668 20.91% 15.57% 4.79% 0.55%
12 tera vali-
date
139583 29244 21838 6630 776 20.95% 15.65% 4.75% 0.56%
13 word
count
77393 16341 12100 3791 450 21.11% 15.63% 4.90% 0.58%
14 word mean 62412 13093 9726 2994 373 20.98% 15.58% 4.80% 0.60%
15 word me-
dian
66401 13435 9869 3161 405 20.23% 14.86% 4.76% 0.61%
16 word stan-
dard devi-
ation
82079 16917 12492 3932 493 20.61% 15.22% 4.79% 0.60%
Average Values 86157 17984 13350 4148 485 20.83% 15.45% 4.81% 0.57%
to follow and which to ignore was difficult and challenging. Execution time and code size of the
experiments are the measured parameters for this work. The overhead in the experiments is calcu-
lated from time measurements. The time taken to detect an attack in a process p is divided by the
execution time of the same process and the result is multiplied by 100 to find the percentage of time
overhead, as given in equation 4.3. Here timedetect(p) is calculated using system clock measurements
for encrypting process analysis information, decrypting received messages and hash matching. The
communication cost in sending data packets from one node to another is not included. The overhead
calculations show the worst case scenario since the input arguments are intentionally low for some
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Table 4.9: Instruction-Level Properties of Spark Performance Test ML Algorithms
E.no Algorithm IC CFI Jumps Calls Returns %
CFI
%
Jumps
%
Calls
% Re-
turns
1 fp growth 216009 46544 35200 10251 1093 21.55% 16.30% 4.75% 0.51%
2 word2vec 147737 30235 22638 6772 825 20.47% 15.32% 4.58% 0.56%
3 chi-sq fea-
ture
172014 35783 26736 8119 928 20.80% 15.54% 4.72% 0.54%
4 spearman 194615 41043 30857 9155 1031 21.09% 15.86% 4.70% 0.53%
5 pearson 184628 38694 28996 8691 1007 20.96% 15.71% 4.71% 0.55%
6 block ma-
trix mult
195714 41245 31030 9174 1041 21.07% 15.85% 4.69% 0.53%
7 summary
statistics
196555 41034 30736 9235 1063 20.88% 15.64% 4.70% 0.54%
8 pca 192280 40427 30377 9020 1030 21.03% 15.80% 4.69% 0.54%
9 svd 143996 29684 22334 6550 800 20.61% 15.51% 4.55% 0.56%
10 gmm 170722 35655 26848 7898 909 20.88% 15.73% 4.63% 0.53%
11 kmeans 170694 35842 26957 7962 923 21.00% 15.79% 4.66% 0.54%
12 als 181836 38032 28603 8428 1001 20.92% 15.73% 4.63% 0.55%
13 decision
tree
175889 36655 27546 8140 969 20.84% 15.66% 4.63% 0.55%
14 naive
bayes
171945 36053 27036 8082 935 20.97% 15.72% 4.70% 0.54%
15 glm classi-
fication
186454 39088 29362 8715 1011 20.96% 15.75% 4.67% 0.54%
16 glm re-
gression
200255 42439 32020 9346 1073 21.19% 15.99% 4.67% 0.54%
Average Values 181334 38028 28580 8471 977 20.95% 15.74% 4.67% 0.54%
of the experiments. Real-world big data programs will be much more complex jobs and hence the
overhead will be much lesser than what is shown here. Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 4.8a and 4.8b
show the analysis of run-times for executing the experiments and the model built from the proposed
system. On average, the overhead of running the model is 3.28%. Linear regression and best-fit
plots, given in Figures 4.9a and 4.9b, were used to show the relation between programs (given in
number of control flow instructions of their assembly representations) and time to detect an attack
in them. The time taken to execute example number 4 i.e. distributed bbp program of Hadoop
MapReduce example set was too high (288 seconds) to plot on the graph shown in Figure 4.8a.
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Figure 4.7: Consistent Distribution of CFI in Hadoop and Spark Tests
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Table 4.10: Run Time Analysis to Analyze and Compare Hadoop MapReduce Examples
Exp.no Time to Execute Time to Detect % Overhead
1 17.56 0.69 3.93%
2 20.14 0.42 2.10%
3 6.39 0.76 11.84%
4 287.62 0.67 0.23%
5 7.96 0.79 9.89%
6 6.48 0.72 11.12%
7 37.63 0.77 2.05%
8 31.51 0.97 3.07%
9 41.71 1.57 3.75%
10 4.45 1.46 32.82%
11 4.99 1.37 27.37%
12 4.61 1.47 31.96%
13 6.68 0.99 14.86%
14 6.63 0.90 13.63%
15 6.64 0.92 13.82%
16 7.76 1.08 13.88%
Average Values 31.17 0.97 3.12%
%overhead(p) =
timedetect(p)
timeexecute(p)
× 100 (4.3)
The proposed system performs a similarity check of control flow within duplicate processes
running on different nodes of a big data cluster. This control flow similarity check is performed by
matching control instruction sequences. Since the infected node is predetermined in the experiments,
the test cases do not have a false positive or false negative. But a false positive will occur when
all data nodes are attacked in the same way. A false negative will occur in case of runtime attacks
or attacks that originate outside the big data platform. But given the attack model, such cases
are not in the scope of this work. Instead, the control flow of the programs is studied to check for
vulnerabilities within the programs. Results from tables 4.8 and 4.9 and figures 4.7a and 4.7b show
instruction level properties of the examples and tests used in the experiments. It can be observed
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Table 4.11: Run Time Analysis to Analyze and Compare Spark-perf MLlib Tests
Exp.no Time to Execute Time to Detect % Overhead
1 2.92 0.34 11.67%
2 12.942 0.24 1.87%
3 3.899 0.28 7.19%
4 15.708 0.33 2.08%
5 3.314 0.31 9.23%
6 3.011 0.34 11.31%
7 5.312 0.35 6.63%
8 8.124 0.34 4.23%
9 24.647 0.30 1.21%
10 4.584 0.33 7.24%
11 7.529 0.35 4.69%
12 16.884 0.36 2.12%
13 31.963 0.37 1.17%
14 1.664 0.37 22.34%
15 8.151 0.41 5.05%
16 8.542 0.45 5.26%
Average Values 9.950 0.34 3.44%
that only 20.8% of the total instruction count in the Hadoop MapReduce examples account for
control flow instructions. In case of spark performance tests for machine learning algorithms, 20.9%
of instructions in the assembly code are control flow instructions. Of all control flow instructions,
jumps are the most significantly used CFI with a lion share of 15.45% of the total instruction count
in Hadoop MapReduce examples and 15.74% of the total instruction count in spark performance
tests. Calls and returns cover only 4.8% and 0.5% respectively in the Hadoop MapReduce example
set and; 4.6% and 0.5% respectively in the spark performance tests set.
It can be inferred from these results that control flow instructions account for only one-fifth
of the total instruction count for a program (assembly code). This is a remarkable coincidence among
these two sets of programs because (a) they belong to different domains - MapReduce on Hadoop,
machine learning in Spark; (b) their source programming language is different - java for Hadoop
MapReduce examples, scala for spark-perf machine learning tests; and (c) they differ in program
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size - 86,000 instructions on average per program for the MapReduce example set and 180,000
instructions on average per program for the spark perf machine learning tests. This observation
strengthens the initial argument that generating dynamic CFG for large and complex big data
programs is cumbersome. This is because the size of CFG is proportional to the code lines which
is related to the number of instructions. Hence, the proposed idea of generating CIS and hashing
them is a good alternative to the CFG memory complexity problem. The overhead incurred in
using the model built from the proposed system architecture is less than 3.28% if it is hosted by the
same hardware that hosts the big data systems. This is in the acceptable range of overhead for big
data platforms such as Hadoop. The time taken by the proposed system to analyze the programs
and compare the results is linearly dependent on the number of control flow instructions in the
program, but not on the number of lines of assembly code. This greatly reduces the complexity
of the similarity analysis from the conventional and complex approach of generating a CFG. Also,
generating CIS only needs a one time parse through the program code (assembly code) and can
be performed independently and in parallel on each node of the cluster. The experimental results
show the feasibility of implementing a model of the proposed system. Building and implementing a
detailed version of this system will demonstrate lower overhead and convince the vendors to adopt
it.
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CHAPTER 5 : RUN-TIME TECHNIQUES1
Having compile-time security techniques will help in reducing the scope of attacks. The next
set of security techniques proposed in this work are dynamic run-time driven methods. While the
compile-time techniques focused on control-flow analysis, the run-time techniques focus on memory
behavior analysis of programs. A run-time security technique is proposed to detect an intrusion after
it attacks the big data system and another security technique is proposed to predict the possibility
of an intrusion before it can attack the system. It makes more sense to have a threat model for
the run-time security techniques because the focus is on protecting the big data system in general
by dynamically observing system behavior instead of protecting the system from specific attacks.
These run-time techniques are add-ons to the compile-time techniques that are more focused on
attack detection.
5.1 Threat Model
A software-centric threat model is used in this work that dissects the big data platform
design to understand its operational vulnerabilities. The main threats considered in this work are
related to data degradation, data theft and configuration manipulation. These threats are a subset
of insider attacks that are not typically handled in the big data world. The common link in these
threats is that they are directly related to compromising the data hosted by the cluster. Hence,
1Portions of this chapter were previously published in Santosh Aditham, Nagarajan Ranganathan, and Srinivas
Katkoori. Memory access pattern based insider threat detection in big data systems. In Big Data (Big Data), 2016
IEEE International Conference on, pages 3625-3628. IEEE, 2016.
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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they have an obvious relation with the cluster infrastructure and memory behavior of datanodes.
The threat model does not consider vulnerabilities originated outside the cluster such as user and
network level vulnerabilities.
The primary focus of when detecting threats is to mitigate the effect of operational vulner-
abilities caused at runtime due to improper usage of system and library calls by programmers. The
reason for this choice is two-fold: (a) impact of operational vulnerabilities due to programmer errors
cannot be estimated upfront, and (b) programmer errors are usually considered to be resolved at
compile time. The threat model also includes illegitimate use of data access privileges by insiders.
For example, the proposed system should identify rogue datanodes masquerading as normal datan-
odes. This can be achieved by analyzing memory access patterns at process level. But it is difficult
to differentiate between unusual accesses and corrupt accesses. For the scope of this work, both
scenarios are treated as threats. Some assumptions about the system were made to fit this threat
model.
• All datanodes use the same architecture, operating system and page size.
• Replica nodes host similar data which is not necessarily the case in a production environment.
• The path to framework installation is the same on all datanodes.
• The communication network will always be intact.
• The communication cost among replicas (slaves) is at most the communication cost between
namenode (master) and datanodes (slaves).
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5.2 Technique Based on Memory Access Patterns and System Calls
One of the popular ways of detecting intrusions is with the help of pattern matching, which
has been around for almost three decades [151]. Typically in pattern matching, there is a defined
class of patterns representing good or expected behavior and raw data is matched against this class
to identify anomalies. Some of the common parameters used in pattern matching for intrusion
detection are: system calls, user activity, network packets, events. For example, using system
information such as system calls for intrusion detection is quite popular in the security domain for
the past two decades [68, 69]. In this work, the idea of pattern matching for intrusion detection is
borrowed and two system parameters are used for adopting this in the big data security domain:
(a) system calls (b) memory accesses.
5.2.1 Proposed Methodology
In this work, the idea of building a process behavior profile based on its system call frequen-
cies and memory access patterns is proposed. Three features of memory access are used to describe
the memory access pattern: resident set, shared pages, private pages. Once a process behavior
profile is built locally, it is then compared with the profile of the process that is scheduled to do the
same job on a replica datanode.
The first part of the proposed solution deals with building a behavior profile for every
process running on a datanode. Process behavior profiles can be built by observing a variety of
process characteristics. For this work, the behavior of a process is described based on the system
& library calls and the memory accesses it makes during its runtime. While system and library
calls help understand the work done by a process, memory accesses talk about the data usage of a
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process. This makes it hard for the attackers to masquerade. The algorithm for creating a process
behavior profile is given in Algorithm 7. The process behavior profile representing the datanode
will be a data structure with three entries: (1) identifier, (2) map with one entry per call, and (3)
t2, T-squared vector from PCA on memory access information. The identifier needs to be similar
for a process across datanodes.
A call instruction in a program has the potential to take the control away from program
space to unknown territories. This property of a call instruction makes it an attractive target for
attackers. In this work, the focus is on two specific kinds of call instructions known as the system
calls and library calls. The system calls are programmatic ways of requesting a kernel service from
the operating system. The list of possible system calls is specific to the operating system in use
and the number of possible system calls is usually constant and limited. For example, Linux family
of operating systems have approximately 140 system calls [152]. Since big data platforms are the
target for this work, it is implicit that a certain framework such as hadoop or spark is installed
on the cluster under surveillance. These frameworks use a lot of third party libraries and hence
we include library call monitoring as well. The advantage of library call monitoring is that the
number of jars and shared library objects can be predetermined and these frameworks should have
a predefined installation path which will not change unless there is a system level modification.
The problem with tracing system & library calls made by a process at runtime is that the
order in which these calls are made might not persist across multiple runs of the same program.
But this is important to the security framework since it tries to match information across replica
datanodes. An exact match on the call stack will not work if call information is to be used for
intrusion detection in a distributed computing domain. To combat this problem, the process be-
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havior profile is designed to be descriptive of the calls made by a process. Instead of using the call
stack, metadata about system & library calls is extracted from the call stack and used for intrusion
detection. Each row in a process behavior profile representing a library or a system call describes
it using four fields: (a) full class name of the callee, (b) method signature, and (c) source code line
number and (d) count of the number of times this call was made by the process. A hash of the
full class name is used as index for quick look-up. The other difficulty in using call information for
intrusion detection is that the number of calls made by a process does not have to be the same for
different datanodes. But a huge variation in the number of times a particular call is made can be
used as an indicator for intrusion.
While monitoring system & library calls helps in profiling a process and detecting some
attacks, this approach is still susceptible to insider attacks. For example, a rogue datanode can
masquerade its identity and send the process information to the security framework before an attack
is launched. This will lead to a false negative scenario where the datanodes reach to a consensus
about a process even though a rogue node compromised a process. Also, system calls in call stack
give relevant information about data used by a process only until a file or device gets mapped
to memory. All further read() and write() calls are made on the mapped memory using pointers.
Hence, it is important to have an alternate perspective about the process when creating its behavior
profile. For this reason, we include memory access information of a process in the behavior profile
as well. Memory access information helps in the fine granularity of event reconstruction. Memory
accesses during runtime give information about program characteristics such as the size of private
and shared memory accessed by the program, number of clean and dirty pages in program memory
etc.
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Algorithm 7 Algorithm to create process behavior profile
1: procedure Behavior Profile
2: pid← get the process id of datanode
3: interval← set periodic interval for measurement
4: getProfile(pid):
5: Profile← empty map
6: Calls← call getCalls(pid)
7: MemAccess← call getMemAccess(pid)
8: Hash← hash of all call paths
9: Profile← insert([Hash, Calls], MemAccess)
10: return Profile
11: getCalls(pid):
12: while callstack(pid) = system or library call do
13: callee← store the callee
14: signature← store the signature of the method
15: callPath← store the path
16: callCount← +1
17: hash← hash of the path
18: info← callee, signature, path, count
19: return map(hash, info)
20: getMemAccess(pid):
21: while elapsed=interval do
22: if smaps(j).type = private or shared then
23: thisAccess[0]← smaps(j).Rss
24: thisAccess[1]← smaps(j).Private
25: thisAccess[2]← smaps(j).Shared
26: MemAccess← add thisAccess
27: Result← call PCA(MemAccess)
28: return Result
There are many advantages of using memory access patterns in behavior profiles, such as:
• information can be gathered periodically.
• can be accomplished easily with hardware support.
• gives insight about the data aspects of a process.
• maintains differential privacy.
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Figure 5.1: Memory Behavior of Datanodes in a Hadoop Cluster
Today, most distributed systems are a cluster of nodes in their abstract forms i.e. each node
is a virtual machine or a process running on a virtual machine. Hence, the process behavior profile
is designed to include memory accesses made by the processes. The downside of this approach,
especially with modern operating systems such as Linux, is that memory analysis becomes a com-
plicated topic. It is extremely difficult to know about how memory is organized inside a running
process and how the kernel handles the different allocation methods and process forking. For ex-
ample, most modern operating systems use copy-on-write semantics when forking a process where
child process address space is mapped to the same backing pages (RAM) as the parent, except that
when the child attempts to write to one of those pages, the kernel transparently copies the memory
contents to a new, dedicated page, before carrying out the write. This approach speeds up the
forking procedure but complicates the memory analysis.
Usually, the kernel delays the actual allocation of physical memory until the time of the first
access. Hence, knowing the actual size of physical memory used by a process (known as resident
memory of the process) is only known to the kernel. This memory mapping information from the
kernel can be used to analyze the memory pattern of processes. A mapping is a range of contiguous
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pages having the same back-end (anonymous or file) and the same access modes. For this work,
features of memory mapping that are relatively straight forward to analyze were chosen. The private
and shared pages of a process in the RAM are observed as parts of memory access patterns. Private
memory always belongs just to the process being observed while shared memory may be shared with
its parent and/or children processes. In theory, the number of pages allocated to a process should
be equal to the sum of its shared and private pages. To alleviate the penalty of constant monitoring,
this information is gathered periodically for every 2 seconds. This time interval is randomly chosen
because it is not an important detail for security research.
Two simple and typical big data work flows are used to demonstrate the insights provided
by system calls and memory accesses of a process. The first example is about writing a 3GB file
to HDFS in a Hadoop cluster. Figure 5.1a shows the results of principal component analysis on
memory mappings (t2) of the datanodes. The 3 dimension plot in Figure 5.1b shows orthogonal
regression among principal components which are calculated from observations made from memory
mapping sizes of a datanode. The three dimensions used in this graph are the three different
measurements taken at process level - resident set, private pages and shared pages. The red line
indicates that the pages in RAM for a process are a combination of its private and shared pages.
One observation or data point that seems to be an outlier. This can be due to multiple reasons
such as swapping or giving away allocated memory to other processes in need etc. Table 5.1 has
the results of f-test performed on t2 statistic calculated as a result of PCA on the sample memory
observations made during this test. A random sample of the smallest and largest memory accesses
are taken into consideration for this test. Though this is atypical for statistical tests, the intent
of this example is to show that the null hypothesis holds true. The first row in the table (h = 0)
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Table 5.1: F-Test Results on t2 Statistic when Datanodes are Idle
F-Test Nodes 1 & 2 Nodes 1 & 3 Nodes 2 & 3
h 0 0 0
p 0.66 0.74 0.9
indicates the test accepts the null hypothesis. Here the null hypothesis is that the data comes from
normal distributions with the same variance. The alternative hypothesis is that the population
variance in memory access sizes of a datanode is greater than that of the other datanode. The
second row of the table, p values, are very high (> 0.5) and imply confidence on the validity of the
null hypothesis that variance in memory access is equal for all datanodes.
The second example shows the simplest case with a Hadoop cluster. Figure 5.1c gives an
insight to the system and library calls made by datanodes when they are idle i.e., no user submitted
jobs but just maintenance. Each slave node made a total of 275 system calls during the time of
observation. The calls and their frequencies were consistent across all data nodes. This can be
observed with the overlapping call frequency patterns in Figure 5.1c. It can be concluded that the
datanodes are in harmony by evaluating either sets of information: (a) the call information of idle
nodes and, (b) the memory access information while putting a file in HDFS.
Representing memory access pattern as a sequence of access size and using approximate
string comparison or edit distance is one way to measure similarity between patterns. But there
are many aspects to a memory access and creating a memory access profile with fine grained detail
preserves more information for comparison across different machines. A straightforward comparison
of all observed memory features is redundant and not always feasible. Hence, an approximation
method on multiple features is used when creating and comparing a process profile than using just
one feature. In this work, each access pattern includes information about three features of a process
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memory access: (a) size of resident pages in the RAM for the mapping, (b) size of shared pages in
that mapping, and (c) size of private pages in the same mapping. PCA is used to fit the measured
3 dimensional data as linear regression and share the resultant t2 information for comparing and
verifying memory access patterns of two datanodes. PCA calculates three metrics for a given sample
dataset: coefficients, scores and mean. The coefficients of a principal component are given in
descending order of component variance calculated by the singular value decomposition (SVD)
algorithm [119]. This is calculated using Equation 5.1 where X is a principal component, λ is the
eigenvalue and Y is the eigenvector. The sample means, x¯ with n observed memory access sizes per
process is calculated using Equation 5.2 where xi is an individual memory access size from datanode
x. The sample variances, σ2x is calculated using Equation 5.3 with n− 1 degrees of freedom. Since
the measurements use multiple features of a memory access, covariances are the eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix of input data and they can be calculated using Equation 5.4 where Wx1,x2 is the
covariance in two features of memory access of datanodes x. Here xi,1 is the memory access size of
the ith observation for the first memory feature. When observing k memory features, there will be
an array of values [xi,1, xi,2...xi,k] for each observation. Scores are the representations of the input
data in the principal component space. The t2 values can be calculated from the memory patterns
on each datanode using Equation 5.5. But using PCA, the t2 values are calculated as sum of squares
distance from the center of the transformed space. Upon having the t2 values, difference between
them can be calculated using one way analysis of variance as given in Equation 5.6 where the null
hypothesis is that all group means are equal. Here, t2x is the t-squared vector for datanode x, t2y is
the t-squared vector for datanode y and p is the probability that the means of t2x and t2y are the
same.
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Algorithm 8 Algorithm to verify process behavior profile
1: procedure Verify Profile
2: pid← get the process id from datanode
3: Local← behavior profile from this node
4: Recv← behavior profiles from other nodes
5: compare():
6: for thread t in pid do
7: result1← call CompareCalls(t)
8: result2← call CompareMemAccess(p)
9: result← result1 & result2
10: notify result . similarity in calls & memory accesses
11: CompareCalls(t):
12: for call c in t do
13: if hash(cpath) = Recv.find() then
14: if count(cLocal) count(cRecv) then
15: return true
16: else
17: return false
18: CompareMemAccess(pid):
19: if compare(t2Recv, t
2
Local) then
20: return true
21: else
22: return false
X = λ1/2Y (5.1)
x¯ =
∑n1
i=1 xi
n1
(5.2)
σ2x =
∑n
i=1(x¯− xi)
n− 1
(5.3)
Wx1,x2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi,1 − x¯)(xi,2 − x¯)T (5.4)
t2x = n(x¯− µ)TW−1x (x¯− µ) (5.5)
p = anova(t2x, t
2
y) (5.6)
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Algorithm 9 Algorithm to compare process behavior profiles
1: procedure Compare Profiles
2: t2Local ← get the process profile from datanode
3: t2Recv ← received process profiles
4: for all t2i do
5: filter(t2i ) . remove tailing t
2 values
6: sort(t2i )
7: if Anova(t2Local, t
2
Recv) then
8: compromised← Tukey(t2Local, t2Recv)
9: return true
10: else
11: return false
The dynamic verifier function is a part of the replica datanodes. It is used to parse a received
behavior profile and use the extracted information to verify a local process. It will help in identifying
process-level anomalies between two replica datanodes. Two algorithms were proposed as part of
anomaly detection: (1) Algorithm 8 is the generic verification algorithm that indicates an anomaly
among process behavior profiles, and (2) Algorithm 9 is the comparison algorithm for differentiating
between two or more memory access patterns. The system & library calls information is given in a
hash map data structure with call as the id and call path as the value. Finding differences at call
path level is simple because the lookup() function on the map will return the path in constant time.
For every call made locally by a datanode, the call path is hashed using SHA-1 hashing algorithm
and the hash map of calls received from the replica datanodes is looked up for the same hash in
its index set. This lookup is quick and a mismatch (or) lack of match indicates that the datanodes
used different set of system or library calls to perform the same task. This is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition to indicate an intrusion. The additional information about calls available in
the behavior profile helps in solidifying the attack detection process. The difference in the number
of times a system or library call is called to perform the same task should be less than a predefined
threshold, δ, when comparing processes from different datanodes.
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Figure 5.2: Runtime Intrusion Detection using Proposed Framework
Memory pattern of a process is represented using t2 values of PCA. Since the t2 values
follow F-distribution, a comparison among memory patterns can be performed in two steps: (a) by
running ANOVA test on the t2 vectors to check if the patterns are different, and (b) by running
Tukey test on the results from the ANOVA test to find the attacked datanode. This can also be
accomplished by any other tests that assess the equality of variances such as F-test, Levene’s test
or Bartlett’s test. In case of ANOVA, if the p-value is low (< 0.05) then it confirms the rejection
of the null hypothesis with strong statistical significance. Then, a multiple comparison test such
as a Tukey test is used to check if the difference in the means of the t2 values is significant. One
big shortcoming of this approach is that it does not help in distinguishing between unusual process
behavior from corrupt behavior. To be able to overcome such shortcomings, techniques such as
reinforcement learning need to be used which is left for future work.
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The proposed intrusion detection algorithm needs a strong framework to support it. For
this purpose, the proposed security framework can be reused for compile-time intrusion detection in
big data platforms [19, 31]. Figure 5.2 shows a high level design of the framework. This framework
is equipped with an inter-node, key-based secure communication protocol. All the messages among
the datanodes are encrypted and use this communication protocol. The framework is assumed to
be hosted on a coprocessor that communicates with the CPU for receiving the input data. Though
a detailed design for such a coprocessor is not given, an ASIC based design would be a good idea for
such a coprocessor. It is assumed that the communication between the coprocessor and the main
processor uses a secure protocol such as the one used by Apple processors to communicate with the
secure enclave coprocessor [153]. Adding new security instructions to the instruction set of a regular
processor can also suffice. The other two elements of this framework are the process profiling phase
and verification & consensus phase. Algorithms 7, 8 and 9 are hosted and used for this purpose.
The distributed nature of the algorithms help in conducting the profiling phase and the verification
phase independently at each datanode in the cluster. This helps a lot in reducing the time taken
for intrusion detection. Attack notification is sent from the primary datanode to the master node
when there is a consensus among the datanodes about the existence of an attack. This consensus
can be established using one of the popular leader election algorithms or consensus algorithms such
as raft and paxos [130].
5.2.2 Experimental Results
To test the proposed solution, a small Amazon EC2 cluster was set-up with 3 datanodes, 1
Namenode and 1 Secondary Namenode. Replication factor of the cluster is set to 3 (default). EC2
m4.xlarge instances were used for hosting the cluster. Each node was running Ubuntu 14.04 and
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was equipped with a 2.4 GHz Intel XeonÂő E5-2676 v3 (Haswell) processor, 4 virtual cores and 16
GB of memory.
In order to simulate a compromised cluster, one of the datanodes was explicitly programmed
as the corrupt datanode. This was achieved by using two synthetic intrusions given in Table 5.2.
These synthetic intrusions represent different kinds of insider attacks such as: (a) misusing the
system access privilege and modifying the system configuration, (b) misusing the data access priv-
ilege and copying user data for personal benefits, and (c) misusing the data access privilege and
sharing or deleting sensitive user data as revenge against the system. Four of the sixteen hadoop
examples that come by default with hadoop installation were used for demonstrating the results. A
list of the MapReduce examples used along with a brief description is given in Table 5.3. Tests are
conducted by running the Hadoop MapReduce examples one at a time on the cluster. Observations
from each data node are logged periodically (every 2 seconds) and later analyzed using the proposed
framework. Statistical analysis and graphs were generated using Matlab software [154].
Two aspects of a process - system & library calls and memory accesses are observed while
running the Hadoop MapReduce examples on the cluster. The call stack of the process running
on the data nodes is monitored. For library & system call information, the path of the concerned
jar file or shared library is used. For memory access pattern of a process, the memory footprint
and memory consumption of that process are required. Memory footprint is obtained by observing
the number of pages referenced by the process. Memory consumption is calculated by looking at
the the size of the mapping that is currently resident in RAM and the size of memory currently
marked as referenced or accessed. In this work, information available through smaps is used which
only reports about memory pages that are actually in RAM. The memory consumption of datanode
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Table 5.2: Two Synthetic Intrusions for Testing the Proposed Solution
Synthetic
Intrusion
Description
Modify the
configuration
Change the configuration on one of the datanodes. For example, allocate less
heap space to slowdown process execution.
Copy and
share data
Access HDFS using a script and make unauthorized personal copies. Share the
data using third party service such as mail client.
Table 5.3: List of Hadoop MapReduce Examples
Exp. Name Description
Random text
writer
A map/reduce program that writes 10GB of random textual data per
node.
Aggregate word
count
An Aggregate based map/reduce program that counts the words in the
input files.
Teragen Generate one terabyte of randomly distributed data.
Terasort Sort one terabyte of randomly distributed data.
processes are monitored by reading the values from smaps of all processes or tasks running on the
datanode. There is a series of lines in the smaps file of a process for each mapping such as the
following: Size, Rss, Pss, Shared Clean, Shared Dirty, Private Clean, Private Dirty, Referenced,
Anonymous, KernelPageSize, MMUPageSize, Locked. For proof of concept, three such features
were picked: Rss, Shared (clean and dirty), Private (clean and dirty) because in theory Rss should
sum up to the combined value of shares and private.
A common problem for big data related academic researchers is the relative lack of high-
quality intrusion detection data sets [155]. This is a much bigger problem if the attacks under
consideration are not network related. Hence, in-house synthetic attacks were created. Once the
system was setup, two synthetic insider attacks were performed on system while it was executing
the four Hadoop MapReduce examples to emulate normal usage of the services.
This attack involves exploitation of access privileges by an insider who is legally allowed
to access the system and its configuration files. An insider who is a system admin can modify
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the configuration properties of a datanode to intentionally impact the performance of the overall
system. To implement this attack, the system admin changes the datanode configuration through
the hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the Hadoop cluster. The amount of memory allocated
for non-DFS purposes on the datanode were increased by 25% and the number of server threads for
the datanode were reduced by changing the handler count to 2. Since this is a one-time modification
made by an authorized user whose job entails modification of the configuration files, usual user-
profiling will not help in detecting the attack.
This attack involves two cases: (a) the use of non-certified (and untrusted) equipment to
transfer data from one machine to another, and (b) the use of certified and trusted software (such
as a mail client) to transfer data from one machine to another. Similar to the previous attack,
the first step involved in this attack is for the system admin to modify the configuration through
the hdfs-site.xml file on of the datanodes of the Hadoop cluster. A new location local to the
system admin account is added to the DFS data directory property. As a result, all blocks at this
datanode have two copies - one copy in the actual HDFS location used while setting up the cluster
and another duplicate copy in the system admin’s local folder. Next, a script is used to simulate
an insider periodically transferring these duplicates files from his local folder of to another remote
location using the mail client service or USB device. Since it is not possible for us to connect a USB
device to Amazon EC2 instances, the system calls involved with using such a device were included
in the attack script.
The results of the Hadoop MapReduce examples are given in Table 5.4. Terasort and Teragen
examples were run on a terabyte of data while Random text writer and aggregate word counter used
a little more than 10GB of data. Because of this variation in data size, it can be noticed that the
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(a) CPU Utilization of Datan-
odes for Teragen
(b) Network In of Datanodes for
Teragen
(c) Network Out of Datanodes
for Teragen
Figure 5.3: Datanode Metrics Analysis for Teragen After Attack (source: Amazon EC2)
(a) CPU Utilization of Datan-
odes for Terasort
(b) Network In of Datanodes for
Terasort
(c) Network Out of Datanodes
for Terasort
Figure 5.4: Datanode Metrics Analysis for Terasort After Attack (source: Amazon EC2)
time taken to complete these examples also changed accordingly. To generate the terabyte of input
data, Teragen took 109 seconds while Terasort took more than 6 times that amount (695 seconds)
to sort the terabyte of data. Random text writer took 22.5 seconds to generate random words of
size 10GB and Aggregate word count took just 14 seconds to count the words in that 10GB of input
data.
While the Hadoop MapReduce examples were executing the way they are supposed to, the
proposed security framework performed its analysis on the datanodes that were contributing to the
successful execution of those MapReduce examples.
110
Table 5.4: Memory Properties of Hadoop MapReduce Examples
Example Data Size Time No. of observations Sum of F p-value(Bytes) (seconds) Node1 Node2 Node3 Squares Statistic
Teragen 10000000000 109.313 58770 59970 60114 0.129 102.95 2.1 e−45
Terasort 10000000000 694.966 118940 127310 124088 0.256 162.19 3.9 e−71
Random
Text
Writer
1102236330 22.543 29681 31850 31025 0.094 48.64 7.7 e−22
Aggregate
Word
Count
1102250820 14.347 29675 31850 31157 0.069 37.29 6.4 e−17
Looking at Attack 1 results (modifying a datanode configuration), it can be noticed from
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 that the Amazon EC2 cluster monitoring metrics such as CPU utilization,
Network traffic (bytes in and out) were unable to detect the insider attack while running the Terasort
and Teragen examples. But the results from the proposed method for the same Hadoop examples
clearly indicate that there is an intrusion in the system, as noticed in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. ANOVA
on the t2 vectors from the datanodes indicates that one of the datanodes has a different distribution
compared to the other two. This can be observed in the p − value column of Table 5.4. In all
four examples, the p− value is extremely low and indicates strong rejection of the null hypothesis
that the means of the three different distributions are similar. The multiple comparison test proves
that the means of these distributions are not equal and that datanode 1 (in blue) is the one that is
different from the other two datanodes (in red). Figures 5.5a - d show the results of ANOVA and
Figures 5.6a - d show the results of multiple comparison test. Interestingly, the call frequency on
all nodes for these examples seemed to follow similar patterns and the number of distinct library
calls made by a datanode is always constant. When considering call frequency analysis for threat
detection, this attack is an example of false positive. It is the system call frequency that hints at
the possibility of an attack. Since the memory size and the number of threads for datanode1 were
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Figure 5.5: Analysis (ANOVA) of Cluster Behavior After a Replica was Compromised.
reduced and compared to the other two datanodes, it can be noticed that the system calls (calls to
the stack) are relatively low for datanode1 in all examples. This can be observed in Figure 5.7.
As for Attack 2 results (illicit copying of data), a USB drive cannot be used to copy files
as the test setup uses Amazon EC2. Instead, the data was accessed from the /dev folder because
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Figure 5.6: Analysis (Tukey) of Cluster Behavior After a Replica was Compromised.
all nodes in the cluster are running on Linux operating system. It must be noted that for this kind
of attack, it is not required to perform an action (run an example) to notice that the system has
been compromised. Hence, this analysis is performed when the system is idle. A script used for
encrypting and sending files in RAM disks as mail attachments to system admin’s personal email
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Figure 5.7: Cluster-level Call Frequencies After a Replica was Compromised by Attack 1.
account. Each file is 4MB in size and it is zipped before sending out as mail attachment. This
leads to a difference in the call frequency pattern of the datanode, as observed in Figure 5.8. It
can be observed from the call frequency in Figures 5.8a and 5.8b that compromised datanode i.e.
datanode1’s call frequency is order of magnitude more when compared to datenode2 and datanode3
which were not compromised.
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Figure 5.8: Cluster-level Call Frequencies After a Replica was Compromised by Attack 2.
5.2.3 Analysis of Algorithm and Results
The time complexity of PCA is O(p2n+ p3) where n is the number of observations and p is
the number of variables in the original dataset. In this case, p = 3 and even in general, the value of
p will be some constant k because it represents the number of features in memory to be observed.
Also, this constant k will be much smaller than n. So, the time complexity of PCA in this case
should be approximately O(n) i.e., linearly dependent on the number of observations made.
In case of memory pattern analysis, if the tails in the observed populations have considerably
larger values compared to the mean of the non-tail data, then those data points will have an impact
on the output of variance analysis tests such as ANOVA. Hence, it is important to first filter
out such data points before running the analysis test. In case of call analysis, there cannot be a
concrete conclusion about the system being attacked based only on frequency of calls obtained from
different datanodes. Hence, we conclude that a combination of both of these methods along with
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other traditional security methods is needed to keep the system safe. Typically, intrusion detection
methods need to account every aspect in a confusion matrix. As for the proposed method :
• True Positive: successful identification of anomalous or malicious behavior. The proposed
framework achieves this for all data attacks because accessing data involves memory allocation
or reference.
• True Negative: successful identification of normal or expected behavior. The proposed frame-
work achieved this when tested on idle datanodes.
• False Positive: normal or expected behavior is identified as anomalous or malicious. The
proposed framework will have this problem if the the memory mapping observations are not
properly cleaned (as mentioned above). A false positive in the proposed framework might also
occur when there is a delay in the communication among datanodes about the profile.
• False Negative: anomalous or malicious behavior should have been identified but the frame-
work could not. This case arises if the all duplicate datanodes in the big data cluster are
attacked by an insider at once. Luckily, this is highly unlikely to happen in case of large,
distributed big data clusters. Other traditional security mechanisms in place will be able to
prevent such cases from happening [8, 9].
5.3 Prediction of Attacks Based on Memory Access Patterns
Until now, the proposed security techniques are useful for intrusion detection. These tech-
niques analyze a program both at compile-time and run-time to detect the existence of an attack.
This makes it hard for a perpetrator to circumvent the security techniques and complete an attack
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successfully. But with the increasing competency of attackers worldwide and the increasing sensitiv-
ity of data hosted by big data systems, it is important to be able to predict attacks as well. Luckily,
artificial intelligence is on the rise and new technologies like machine learning and deep learning can
be leveraged by the security domain to come up with novel intrusion prediction techniques. In this
work, a deep learning technique called Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is used for time-series
prediction of data attacks in a big data system.
5.3.1 Proposed Methodology
Memory access pattern of a process can be modeled as a time-series where each data point
is the size of the memory used by the process at a particular instance. The latest operating systems
have advanced memory management techniques where each memory access can be described using
multiple features. The memory access pattern of a process is modeled as a multi-featured time series
and use LSTM to predict the size of the next memory access. The intention behind this approach
is to associate a process to a predefined class of memory usage and verify, during run-time, if the
process behavior is in sync with the generalized behavior of processes belonging to its class. A
novel method is proposed to fit this idea in the two-step intrusion detection framework. The overall
algorithmic flow of the proposed method can be seen in Figure 5.9.
Proposing the use of machine learning techniques for prediction models is not new. For
example, Allesandro et al. [156] proposed the use of Support Vector Machines for predicting ap-
plication failure. Murray et al. [157] used naive Bayesian classifiers for predicting failure in hard
drives. Recently, researchers from Facebook [122] used stack-augmented recurrent networks to pre-
dict algorithm behavior. We believe that predicting memory behavior of datanodes in a big data
cluster to anticipate data oriented insider attacks has not been done before. In this work, we use
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Figure 5.9: Steps for Attack Prediction using LSTM Technique
LSTM as a tool for prediction but the same can be achieved using other prediction techniques as
well.
The first step when trying to predict or detect attacks in a system is to understand the way
the system works. When a job is submitted to the big data cluster, a resource manager or scheduler
such as yarn will schedule that job to run on datanodes that host the required data. Each replica
datanode is supposed to execute the same job on their copy of the data to maintain data consistency.
This replication property of a big data cluster helps in predicting an attack. By monitoring the
memory behavior of replica datanodes and understanding their correlation, the memory requirement
of a datanode in near future can be predicted with some certainty.
The proposed memory behavior prediction method involves running a LSTM network on
the memory mapping data obtained locally and independently at each datanode of the big data
cluster. For this work, four different features of memory are monitored:
• the actual size of memory mappings.
• Resident set (RSS) that varies depending on caching technique.
• Private pages to characterize a particular workload.
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• Shared pages to understand the datanode workload in the background, especially when the
job is memory intensive.
Hence, each data point in the observed memory access sequence is a vector of size four. Since
the readings are taken at regular time intervals, this data resembles a time series. From Equation
2.1, the input to the LSTM cell at time step t − 1 is it−1 which is a data point with four values
< a, b, c, d > where a is the size of the mapping, b is the size of pages in the resident set of the
memory, c is the size of private pages and d is the size of shared pages. The recurrent LSTM network
in this case is simply a single LSTM cell with a feedback loop. The decision reached at time step
t− 1 affects the decision it will reach at time step t. After a memory data point is fed to the LSTM
cell as input, the output ot at the next time step t is the predicted output. During training phase,
this output is compared with the actual observed value for correctness and the weights and bias
of the LSTM cell are adjusted accordingly. For this purpose, a standard metric called Root Mean
Squared Error (RMSE) is used. RMSE, as given in Equation 5.7, is a general purpose error metric
for numerical predictions. Here, n is the number of observations in the sequence, yk represents a
single observation and yˆ denotes the mean of the sequence so far. It is sensitive to small errors and
severely punishes large errors. When the RMSE falls above/below a predefined threshold T , it is an
indication the datanode behavior is abnormal. But an observed anomaly in the memory behavior
at a datanode at this stage is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to predict an attack.
For this reason, a second step called consensus is introduced in the proposed method. The data
points representing the observed and the expected memory usage for a certain time window τ is
shared with other replica nodes using the secure communication protocol for consensus.
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RMSE =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
k=1
(yk − yˆ)2 (5.7)
The same framework is used to host the proposed attack prediction method. This framework
facilitates secure communication among datanodes to exchange their local analysis results, share the
statistical test results for consensus and notify the master node, if necessary. The framework uses
encryption/decryption techniques such as AES along with communication protocols such as SSH
and proposes the use of hardware security such as TPM and secure co-processors for key generation,
storage and hashing.
When a datanode receives memory behavior data from other replica datanodes, it compares
that data with its local data to verify for similarity. The procedure used for such comparison
can vary among different implementations. In this work, the comparison technique uses statistical
analysis methods: ANOVA for variance and Tukey for multiple comparison. Both datasets are two-
dimensional with predicted values and actual values. Each replica datanode runs a one-way variance
test, ANOVA to measure correlation between local data and received data. If the null hypothesis is
rejected, then a multiple comparison test (Tukey test) is used to find the corrupt datanode. When
a consensus is reached among datanodes about a possible attack, necessary prevention steps such
as notifying the master node can be taken.
5.3.2 Experimental Results
This section presents the experiments and their results in two parts: the first part describes
the setup of Hadoop cluster, LSTM network and the choice of programs to test the proposed method;
the next part explains the results observed from the conducted experiments.
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Table 5.5: Machine Configurations
Attribute Value
Purpose Hadoop LSTM
EC2 Instance Model t2.micro N/A
Processor Intel Xeon with Turbo AMD A8 Quad Core
Compute Units 1 (Burstable) 4
vCPU 1 N/A
Memory (GB) 1 16
Storage Elastic Block Store SATA
Networking Performance low N/A
Operating System Linux/UNIX Ubuntu 16.04
Software distribution Hadoop 2.7.1 Keras
Tensor Flow
Amazon EC2 is used to set up a small Hadoop cluster of 3 datanodes, 1 namenode and 1
secondary namenode. All programs used for testing are obtained from Hadoop MapReduce examples
that come with the basic installation of Hadoop and run on this Hadoop cluster. Some detail about
these MapReduce programs are given in Table 5.6. A standard quad-core desktop is used to run
Keras & Tensor Flow frameworks required for implementing a LSTM network. Statistical tests were
conducted using Matlab. The configuration of the Hadoop nodes and the LSTM machine are given
in Table 5.5.
First, each Hadoop MapReduce example is run on the cluster for a hundred times. For
every iteration, the memory readings are taken periodically with a time interval of five seconds from
/proc/pid/smaps which is a linux tool for observing memory usage of processes. Average values
of the four memory features - size, resident set, private pages and shared pages are calculated and
stored in an array of four-dimensional vectors. By the end of hundred iterations, a time series
history of process behavior is obtained where each data point gives information about the memory
behavior of the process for a specific run. This is a part of local analysis and it is done in parallel
on every datanode.
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Next, the time series data of a process i.e., one hundred time steps of four-dimensional data
points, is fed to a LSTM network. The LSTM network has one hidden layer of four LSTM cells and
a dense output layer of four neurons (fully connected) to predict four memory features. It looks
back at one previous time step when predicting a new value and the batch size is also set to one.
80% of this data is used for training the LSTM network and the remaining 20% of data is used
for testing the LSTM network. The number of epochs varied between 50 and 100. RMSE is used
to calculate accuracy of the LSTM network for both training and testing phase. By the end of
this step, the LSTM network of every datanode is trained and tested on normal behavior of that
datanode.
Finally, three different kinds of insider attacks are simulated in the Hadoop cluster and
datanode memory behavior when running the Hadoop MapReduce examples is captured again in
the same way as mentioned before. The details about these attacks are given in Table 5.7. For
demonstration, the datanodes were infected by increasing thread count allocated for HDFS, allowing
the datanode to cache and increasing the cache report and cache revocation polling time (making
the datanodes faster). Also, the datanodes were running two separate scripts in the background:
one for sending emails of data and another to modify logs. This data is then used for testing the
LSTM network that has been trained by using the same 80% data from above experiments. The
challenge that these attacks impose is that there is no error or change in program behavior with
respect to correctness.
There are three sets of results in this work.
• The first set of results show a comparison between the program behavior when the datanodes
are not yet compromised and when they are compromised, as shown in Figure 5.10. Here, the
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Table 5.6: List of Hadoop MapReduce Examples
E.No. Name Description
1 aggregateword-
count
An Aggregate-based map/reduce program that counts the words in
the input files.
2 bbp A map/reduce program that uses Bailey-Borwein-Plouffe to compute
exact digits of Pi.
3 pentomino A map/reduce tile laying program to find solutions to pentomino
problems.
4 pi A map/reduce program that estimates Pi using a quasi-Monte Carlo
method.
5 randomtex-
twriter
A map/reduce program that writes 10GB of random textual data per
node.
6 randomwriter A map/reduce program that writes 10GB of random data per node.
7 sort A map/reduce program that sorts the data written by the random
writer.
8 wordcount A map/reduce program that counts the words in the input files.
Table 5.7: Insider Attacks on a Datanode
No. Title Description Impact
1 Mail Attack A system admin is sending out user data as attachments
from datanode to personal email account.
Data Privacy
2 Configura-
tion
Attack
A system admin changes the HDFS configuration of a
datanode he/she has access to.
Datanode
performance
3 Log
Deletion
Attack
A system admin modifies user data and deletes the log files
on a datanode he/she has access to.
System
Analysis
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Figure 5.10: Datanode Memory Behavior (Before and After Attack).
results are shown for one datanode and each Hadoop MapReduce job is analyzed using four
different features of memory.
• The next set of results show the accuracy in the prediction of datanode memory behavior
by the LSTM network. These results can be observed in Figure 5.11 and Table 5.8. Since
the range of the input data is between (150 − 7500), RMSE in the range of (1 − 60) can be
considered as good prediction.
• The final set of results show the efficiency of the prediction algorithm when tested on the
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(a) Pi (b) BBP
(c) Pentomino (d) Word Count on 3GB File
(e) Random Text Write + Aggregated Word Count (f) Random Write + Sort
Figure 5.11: LSTM Analysis of Memory Behavior of a Datanode for MapReduce Examples
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Table 5.8: RMSE Results from LSTM while Predicting Datanodes Memory Mappings
E.No. Epochs Stage Samples RMSE
DN1 DN2 DN3
2 50
TRAIN 78 7.49 8.33 0.95
TEST(normal) 18 4.92 6.69 1.27
TEST(attack) 57 5586.74 5496.8 6590.52
3 50
TRAIN 78 7.83 5.77 2.58
TEST(normal) 18 5.78 5.08 1.19
TEST(attack) 57 5747.34 5578.56 6684.66
4 50
TRAIN 78 6.85 25.67 24.85
TEST(normal) 18 6.42 56.28 8.74
TEST(attack) 37 6007.43 5678.18 5977.24
8 50
TRAIN 78 11.87 17.74 5.7
TEST(normal) 18 12.44 19.40 9.61
TEST(attack) 22 2063.7 1870.45 1842.91
1+5 50
TRAIN 158 20.93 16.73 19.38
TEST(normal) 38 15.33 17.12 9.57
TEST(attack) 20 6180.51 5328.91 5852.19
6+7 100
TRAIN 238 12.49 12.26 13.37
TEST(normal) 58 11.46 10.71 14.2
TEST(attack) 27 5972.78 5742.77 5545.03
Hadoop cluster with corrupt or compromised datanodes. These results can be observed in
Figure 5.11 and Table 5.8. Since the range of the input data is between (150− 20000), RMSE
in the range of (1800− 6700) can be considered as poor prediction.
5.3.3 Analysis of Algorithm and Results
The Hadoop MapReduce examples used in this work represent a variety a of workloads.
Programs such as Pi, BBP, Pentomino use MapReduce jobs that are compute intensive but use
very less memory. The execution time of a single run of these programs is less than 5 seconds.
Programs such as Random Write, Sort, Random Text Write, Aggregate Word Count are memory
intensive and at the same time they represent multi-tasking. While the Random Write, Random
Text Write programs are limited to writing data to HDFS, the Sort, Aggregate Word Count
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Figure 5.12: LSTM Root Mean Square Error Loss Convergence
programs use more memory because they are both memory and compute intensive tasks. Each of
these jobs took less than 2 minutes to complete working on their 1GB of input data. The datanode
alternates between these two programs for each run. Finally, the Word Count program, which is
very similar to Sort, Aggregate Word Count programs shows that the replica datanode behavior
is not always similar to one another even if the Hadoop cluster is not under attack. The input for
this job was three times that of the other jobs and each job took almost 8 minutes to complete.
While the LSTM network of every datanode is trained using the data from normal runs of
the programs, the testing datasets were different. One testing dataset represents normal behavior
and the other represents compromised behavior. As shown in Figure 5.12, the convergence in loss
plateaus after 50/100 epochs. This shows the efficiency of the LSTM model during training. The
values in the test results differ by a huge margin as shown in Test(normal) row and Test(attack)
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row of every MapReduce program in Table 5.8. It can be observed that the RMSE increased
from a small value in the range of 1-60 to a much bigger value in the range of 1800-6700. That
huge difference in the RMSE can be attributed to the type of attacks that were introduced. Since
the attacks improved the memory performance of datanodes, they made the datanodes use more
memory. Though it is difficult to come up with a fixed number or range in RMSE difference to denote
compromised behavior, the idea here is to have application specific threshold, T , that represents
the acceptable range of deviation between training and testing phase in order to predict an attack
successfully. The attacks used in the experiments are designed to explicitly show such huge impact.
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CHAPTER 6 : LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, a security framework for big data systems is developed to detect insider
attacks quickly with low overhead. The system consists of a two step attack detection algorithm
and a secure communication protocol. The first step in our algorithm is to independently conduct
local analysis of processes at slave nodes of a big data cluster. The second step is to verify the
validity of the analysis from the first step where the replica nodes of the big data cluster come
to a consensus about the existence of an attack. The main support for our work comes from the
replication property of big data systems because it enforces coherence in program behavior among
replica datanodes that is needed to maintain data consistency. The central theme of this work
revolves around the idea of delegating security as an independent module for big data systems and
hence the various components needed for such security models are proposed and discussed in detail.
First, an intrusion detection technique is introduced that suspects the existence of an attack
on nodes with primary copy of data. This is achieved by analyzing the control flow instructions
of processes running on them. A custom metric called attack probability score is calculated per
processes to help identify attacks in the system and avoid false positives. All communications related
to our framework are encrypted using keys generated from master keys unique to their host nodes.
Attack confirmations are based on consensus among the replica nodes that host a given dataset. By
evaluating our proposed framework on the CPU and Crypto benchmarks of Phoronix Test Suite, it
is shown that the proposed can identify attacks with very negligible time overhead (0.01%).
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Next, a simple hash string matching technique is proposed to fulfill the distributed process
similarity check and identify attacks. A secure communication protocol for data nodes that uses
periodically generated random keys is proposed to conduct the detection algorithm. A model of the
proposed system is tested in real-time on Amazon’s EC2 clusters using a different sets of Hadoop
and Spark programs. The time overhead was 3.28% and it is observed from the results that the
proposed security system uses only 20% of program code to detect attacks.
Next, a novel approach that uses control flow analysis to detect program level intrusions is
introduced. Behavior of a program is modeled by extracting a MSA set representation of its CFG.
Similarity check among duplicate programs is performed by a complete matching among hashed
sets of MSAs. Experiments were conducted on real-world Hadoop MapReduce examples and it is
observed that the proposed technique takes only 0.8% of execution time to identify intrusions. The
naturally sparse nature of CFGs helps in achieving this low overhead.
Then, a runtime technique to mitigate vulnerabilities and detect attacks is proposed. This
technique analyzes system & library calls along with memory accesses of a process, packs all of the
analysis information together as a process behavior profile and shares that profile with other replica
datanodes in the system. The replica datanodes verify the received call traces and access patterns
with their local processes for attack detection. Experimental results show that our approach can
detect insider attacks even in cases where the usual CPU and network analysis fail to do so, when
tested on Hadoop MapReduce examples.
Finally, a method to predict (and successively detect) an internal data attack on a Hadoop
cluster is introduced. This technique works by analyzing individual datanode memory behavior
using LSTM recurrent neural networks. The core of our idea is to model memory mappings of a
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datanode using multiple features and represent that data as time series such that a recurrent neural
network such as LSTM can predict program level memory requirements. When the actual memory
usage differs from the predicted requirement by a huge margin, datanodes in a big data cluster share
that information and come to a consensus regarding the situation. The efficiency of this method is
demonstrated by testing it on a Hadoop cluster using a set of MapReduce open-benchmarks and
infecting the cluster using predefined attacks. During the course of this work, it is understood that
big data systems do not need new security algorithms but they need the old techniques to be applied
in new combinations.
6.1 Future Work
For future work, we would like to develop a detailed architecture for coprocessors that can
host the proposed framework. Also, there is a lot of scope for improvement with regards to the
proposed security techniques:
• The compile-time technique based on attack probability score is based on weak rule engine.
So, a well established rule engine that fits in a heterogeneous system with different instruction
sets is required.
• The proposed string matching method for CFG has to be compared with other graph isomor-
phism techniques.
• All control-flow based techniques need to be compared with relevant works such as CFI and
symbolic execution.
• More variations of LSTM and other recurrent neural networks need to be tried and tested
when predicting attacks.
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A major bottleneck for this research was in finding the right set of benchmarks to test our
proposed techniques. So, as part of future work, the proposed methods have to be tested and verified
on a broader set of industry datasets. Also, all proposed techniques must to be evaluated with
security related big data benchmarks when available. All proposed techniques must be compared
with other existing security techniques and a formal proof about the efficiency of the techniques
proposed is good to have. Finally, we would like to explore the concept of differential privacy.
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